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October 1992 marked the quincentennial of the "discovery" of the North
and South American continents by European explorers. The occasion provides
a fitting opportunity to review the history of interaction between the people
of the Americas and the Europeans. As European greed and populations
expanded, their explorers headed west in search of land and wealth. They
brought to this hemisphere not only immigrants, but also new political
structures, cultures, traditions, religions, technologies, economic systems,
biases, diseases, languages, and foods. Those imports radically changed the
lives and land of the aboriginal peoples they encountered.
When Columbus arrived in the Caribbean in the fall of 1492, he discovered
a land already inhabited by millions of people, organized into distinct political
and cultural groups. To him they were only heathen savages suitable for
servitude, but in fact centuries of civilization and sophisticated systems of
spiritual beliefs had developed among them on a continent rich in resources.
The domination of the indigenous people in the Americas began with the first
people Columbus encountered, the Arawaks, who were taken "by force in
order that they might learn and give [Columbus] information of whatever
there is in these parts."' After Columbus' second expedition to the area he
brought 500 Arawak men, women, and children back to Spain as slaves.
In the 250 years that followed, the population of the Arawaks was cut in
half by genocide, slave labor, and disease The European explorers enslaved,
exterminated, or removed these aboriginal people who occupied the land they
needed for expansion. The Europeans, like the Arawaks, appreciated the
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1. HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (1980).
2. In North America, the estimated 10 million Indians inhabiting the continent at the time
Columbus arrived would eventually be reduced to one million. Ik at 16. More recent scholarship
has concluded that the total population of the hemisphere was 75 million to 100 million (with
eight million to 12 million people living north of present-day Mexico). DAVID E. STANNARD,
AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS AND THE CONQUEST OF THE NEw WORLD 11 (1992). The
Arawak people alone likely numbered close to eight million. Id. at 72.
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abundance of resources in this land, but to the Spanish these resources meant
opportunity for economic gain. In the name of progress and religious
enlightenment the entire Arawak way of life was sacrificed. Their history was
to be repeated time and time again whenever the Europeans discovered new
uses for the land which was the home of the people they called "savages."
These civilized Europeans took the land, the culture, the spirituality, the
children, and the vitality of the "savages" they conquered. The Native
Americans continue to struggle today to regain what has been taken from
them.
Because the peoples of the Americas are too many, and their struggles to
continue to practice their "religions" are too varied for one article to cover
comprehensively, this article will focus on the experience of the northern
Native Peoples in what has become the United States. The international
influence of the legal system of the United States recommends its history of
relationship with its native population as an example of the treatment of
indigenous peoples. For all its abuses, the legal relationship between the
Indian nations of North America and the United States government is seen as
quite positive.3 Some tribes still retain a semblance of independent legal
status, and the political process continues to bring Indian concerns to the fore.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the statements of the
United States Congress will provide the context for a brief overview of the
conditions of the North American indigenous peoples throughout the history
of the United States.
This article will trace the legal history of the Native Americans, especially
in their fight for respect for their spiritual practices. To set the stage for the
drama cf this spiritual and cultural tragedy, this article will first draw out the
backdrop of the relationship between the first Americans and the European
immigrants. The initial section of this article will show that the dominant
culture has vacillated between respecting the autonomy of the Native Peoples
and compelling their assimilation into United States society. This article will
discuss some of the prevailing attitudes and theories that undergirded the
frequently brutal and exploitive, and occasionally the benign, actions of the
government with respect to these people.
The second section focuses specifically on the legal question of the right
of the Native Americans to freely practice their spiritual beliefs.4 This section
will first briefly summarize the history of religious rights in the United States,
then describe how evolving free exercise jurisprudence has impacted Native
American free exercise claims. The cases and jurisprudence pertaining to
3. VINE DELORIA, GOD Is RED 282 (1973). Vine Deloria even says that "[a]mong all the
nations of the world the United States, because of its secular concern forjustice, has created the
best record for dealing with aboriginal peoples." Id.
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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"sacred site" claims will be the focus of some attention. In these cases,
Indians attempt to protect particular places from government actions which
threaten to limit the ability of Native Americans to practice their "religion."
The Lyng v. Northwest Cemetery Protective Ass'n5 decision is the most recent
Supreme Court opinion addressing a sacred site claim, and section three will
attend to the questions raised by that case in some detail.
The fourth section attempts to delineate some of the reasons why Native
American spiritual practices receive so little protection. Because most of the
judicial decisions reflect serious misunderstandings about Indian spiritual
beliefs, this section summarizes some of the prominent features of Indian
spirituality. There is a wealth of scholarship on this subject which cannot be
exhausted in this forum, lut this section will highlight some salient differenc-
es, because the religions of the majority culture and the spirituality of Native
Americans.
There is little cause for hope at the present time. Indian blood is no longer
being shed to advance white civilization, but as one Native American said,
"They're not killing us on the plains anymore. Now they're killing us in the
courts." The result is not substantively different even though the campaign is
more subtle.
There arf two potential avenues for reform and the fifth section of this
article describes their promise. The first requires jurisprudential reform, in the
form of a resuscitation of the worn-out Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. The Court must recognize that Native American spiritual
practice claims are different from the nonreligious practice claims other
groups legitimately make upon the state. When Native Americans predicate
their claims against the government on religious grounds, they deserve to be
treated the same as all others who claim protection for religious practice. No
foreseeable judicial reform is on the horizon. The Supreme Court has
abdicated its responsibility to protect Native American rights and in Lyng
stated that the only potential solutions were legislative.6
The American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) had the potential
to provide the kind of protection that Native American religious practices
require. The courts have, however, construed the statute very narrowly so as
to be "without teeth."' Several amendments have been proposed to strengthen
AIRFA.9 Unfortunately, those amendments failed to receive sufficient
legislative support. Congress in 1993 has had before it both the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act" and the Native American Free Exercise of
5. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
6. Id. at 458.
7. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988)).
8. See infra § 11, pt. C.
9. 1990, 1991, 1992.
10. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See infra
No. 2]
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Religion Act." These bills represent the only realistic hope Native Americans
have today for their ability to practice their spiritual beliefs and their way of
life. This legislation will provide the legal recourse Native Americans have
not found in the Constitution. Although they do not provide the permanent
protections that Native Americans deserve, they should both be passed.
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and President Clinton
signed it into law on November 16, 1993," but the prospects for the passage
of the Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act are not good. Only
passage of both bills will provide the measure of protection Native American
spiritual practices merit.
These recommendations will be supported in due time, but first it is
necessary to present some of the history and context of these issues. The
history of the first peoples on this continent is important in part because their
stories have been silenced, as the stories of women, African-Americans, gays
and lesbians, refugees, and other oppressed peoples have been silenced before.
The histories of the First Peoples are not often considered in abstract legal
debates about jurisprudence, excessive entanglement, compelling interests, or
legislative policy. Those stories have not often been told with the honesty and
humility that centuries of abuse, deception, and disrespect should engender.
Our present political discussion is impoverished if we fail to consider what
has transpired in the past. Only with a clear understanding of our collective
history can advocates and policy makers begin to appreciate the importance
of the issues at hand.
L The Indigenous Americans
A. The Colonial Period (1492-1776)
Europeans justified the acquisition of land in the Americas two ways: first,
as the religious duty of an enlightened and civilized people; and second, as
the legal result of "discovering" previously unclaimed land. The colonizing
powers secured their interests in the new land by proving to other European
powers that they were the first to "discover" a new piece of territory. This
rationalization became known as the "Discovery Doctrine," a geographic "first
come, first served" theory in which the only relevant players were the
competing European countries.3 The existence of native populations on these
territories was irrelevant to colonial claims.
Francisco de Vitoria, the Spanish legal philosopher and theologian,
challenged the validity of the doctrine of discovery, arguing that the Indians
note 12 and accompanying text.
11. S. 1021, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
12. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488.
13. STANNARD, supra note 2, at 234-36.
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were the true owners of the land. He believed that the "aborigines undoubted-
ly had true dominion in both public and private matters, just like Christians
and that neither their princes nor private persons could be despoiled of their
property on the ground of their not being true owners."'4 Vitoria's views
were predicated on a fundamental belief in human equality. Indians were no
different from Europeans, he reasoned, and therefore their land could only be
taken from them by consent or through conquest resulting from a just war.
Since the law between states at that time only recognized discovery as an
authoritative source of title when the land was previously uninhabited,
discovery of the inhabited territories in the East was inadequate to fend off
other claimants.
Based on the "discovery" by Columbus, the Pope legitimized the claims of
Spain to the "New World" and proclaimed her dominion over all lands
previously unclaimed by other European powers.'6 The intersection between
law and religion at this time was significant. Juan Gines de Sepcilveda, at the
great debate at Valladolid organized by Charles V in Spain, argued that
because the aboriginal people were not Christian, they therefore lacked any
legitimate claim to their land, allowing it to be taken for the Church. 7
Sep Ilveda, an eminent Spanish scholar, believed that the Indians were inferior
barbarians who engaged in human sacrifice and who were destined for
servitude. The role of the State and the Church was to Christianize and
civilize the "savages," purportedly for their own benefit.' The paganism of
the "savages" justified the usurpation of their lands. There was no doubt that
the new lands could be taken from the natives; the interesting question was
whether those acquisitions could be protected from the other colonial powers.
The Spanish argued that their discovery of the new continent, plus the papal
grants, created an exclusive claim to the new territories.'
Bartolom6 de Las Casas, the confrontational slave owner-turned-priest and
champion of the Indian people, countered Sepulveda's argument. For five days
at the debate, Las Casas recounted tales of Spanish cruelty toward the
14. ROBERT N. CLINTON Er AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 139 (1991).
15. S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law in Historical
and Contemporary Perspective (1989) (symposium paper) in HARVARD INDIAN LAW SYMPOSIUM
211 (Harvard Law School Publications Center 1990).
16. BARTOLOMI DE LAS CASAS: THE ONLY WAY 10 (Helen R. Parish ed., Francis P.
Sullivan trans., 1992) (citing POPE ALEXANDER VI, BULL OF DONATION (May 3, 1493)). Later
popes were to overturn the doctrine of title by discovery or conquests supported by their
predecessors. Pope Paul III argued that the Indians "are not to be deprived of their liberty or the
right to their property. They are to have, to hold, to enjoy both liberty and dominion, freely,
lawfully." Id. at 115 (citing SUBLIMIS DEUS (June 2, 1537)).
17. THOMAS R. BERGER, A LONG AND TERRIBLE SHADOW: WHITE VALUES, NATIVE RIGHTS
IN THE AMERICAS, 1492-1992, at 20 (1991).
18. Id. at 20-21.
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 17.
No. 2]
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American natives. He described the Spaniards as "ravening beasts, killing,
terrorizing, afflicting, .torturing, and destroying the native peoples, doing all
this with the strangest and most varied ... methods of cruelty, never seen or
heard before .... ,2 He claimed that the Spanish only had a right to enter
Indian land to Christianize the Indians. Las Casas disputed Sepulveda's
portrayal of the Indians as savages by describing their spiritual practices, their
cultures, and their political organizations."
No formal decision was reached at the debate at Valladolid. The
discussion, both about the relationship between the Europeans and the
American inhabitants and which, if any, European country held title to the
newly acquired lands, continued among other thinkers. Hugo Grotius, the
Dutch jurist and statesman, followed Sepulveda's reasoning. He believed that
legal authority derived from universal norms rather than the acts of temporal
authorities and positive law. Grotius aimed to remove the religious grounds
for a just war and rejected title by discovery. Unlike some of the Spanish
who viewed the Indians as brutish or inhuman, Grotius acknowledged their
ability to make treaties with the Europeans and their fundamental right to self-
governance.
The French and English contested the Spanish claims in America because
the Spanish had not consummated their discovery with effective occupation
and possession. England and France argued that only on those lands where
Spain exercised control and maintained settlements could she claim dominion.
Once th- occupying powers dismissed paganism as grounds for a just war
against the natives, colonization became the most acceptable proof of
possession.
Unlike their Central and South American counterparts, the North American
colonies were primarily English in origin, though the French and Spanish also
had substantial land holdings. The relationship between the newly arrived
English and the established indigenous people began with a gift and ended in
virtual annihilation. The first immigrants were supported by the Indians and
taught how to survive in the "new" land. Their generosity was not returned,
however. For example, after Richard Greenville landed in Virginia in 1585,
his party encountered an Indian who "stole" a silver cup." Greenville plun-
dered and burned the entire Indian village nearby. As more and more refugees
from religious intoleration and poverty came to the colonies, land became
scarce and the colonists took by force what the natives had earlier given
freely.
21. Id. at 15 (citing BARTOLOMA DH LAs CASAS, THE DEVASTAON OF THE INDIEs: A BRIEF
AccouNT (Herna Briffault trans., 1974)).
22. Id at 22.
23. See STANNARD, supra note 2, at 218.
24. BERGER, supra note 17, at 196.
25. 2INN, supra note 1, at 12.
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The colonies were an export operation designed to return wealth to the
European continent and Britain. The private charter companies commissioned
by the colonizing powers viewed the New World as a source of raw materials
and power. The colonists generally found it easier to cooperate with the local
inhabitants, who had already established a system of trade and exchange, than
to combat them. As a result, the companies actually purchased the title to
land held, by the natives and promised to respect Indian land holdings.'
However, the experience of the natives was far from uniform. After
settlement began in earnest, some of the colonies expropriated land by force
while others maintained strictly diplomatic relations with the natives. The
Crown set the basic policies, but each colony held general authority to
manage its own affairs with the Indians.27
The Carolinas, for example, were developed by Indian slaves.'- Early
trading in deer skins gave way to trading in Indians after white settlers from
Barbados brought the slave trade with them.2' The Indians wanted guns,
metal knives, and cooking utensils which the English offered in exchange for
assistance in capturing slaves. In this way the tribes were encouraged to work
and fight against one another. Despite condemnation from the government in
England and from the Church, the settlers continued their brutal exploitation
of Indian slave labor3" These English entrepreneurs were not troubled by the
issues of the debate between Las Casas and Sepulveda.3' Theirs was an
economic, not an evangelical mission, and the slave trade in Indians was a
profitable business.
By the mid-1700s the less exploited tribes of the North were dissatisfied
with the persistent land fraud, broken agreements, encroaching white
settlement, and trade inequities.32 Hostilities were frequent. The English
government attempted to centralize relations with the Indians by appointing
two agents to conduct the relations between the Indian nations and the Crown.
The "Albany Conference" was convened in 1754 to address Indian complaints
about fraudulent land transactions.33 With the Royal Proclamation of 1763,'
the Crown declared all lands west of the crest of the Appalachians to be
Indian Territory and forbade English settlers from taking possession of those
26. Sharon L. O'Brien, The Application of International Law to the Legal Status of American
Indians 21 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon) [hereinafter O'Brien,
International Law].
27. CLINTON Er AL., supra note 14, at 140.
28. BERGER, supra note 17, at 47.
29. Id. at 48.
30. Id. at 51.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 60.
33. Id.
34. Royal Proclamation of 1763, reprinted in R.S.C., No. 1 app. I, at 1 (1985).
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or any other lands reserved to the Indians? The most important provision
of the Proclamation prohibited land sales by anyone but the Crown?6 The
reservation of land not previously purchased or ceded was absolute." The
Appalachian crest became the "Proclamation Line.' 3 In the short term, this
segregation eased tensions by minimizing interaction.
The principal goals of British policy at this time were to preserve the
colonial foothold on Native American soil so that the resources of the new
land could continue to flow, and to avoid disruption of trade. The rights of
the Indians were observed more often in rhetoric than in practice and the
tradition of pushing the Indians further west began. Nonetheless, the property
rights of most of the Indian nations were never again to receive as much
respect as they did under English, occupation.
B. A Change of Government (1776-1789)
During the Revolutionary War, almost every Indian nation fought on the
side of the British. 9 The colonists, therefore, struggled valiantly to secure
the neutrality of tribes who were not actively fighting. Even Henry Knox, the
first Secretary of War, said, "The Indians, being the prior occupants possess
the right of the soil."' He noted that "[ilt is a melancholy reflection, that our
modes of population have been more destructive to the Indian natives than the
conduct of the conquerors of Mexico and Peru. The evidence of this is the
utter extirpation of nearly all the Indians in the most populous parts of the
Union."" The first treaty between the emancipated colonists and the natives
was signed on September 17, 1778. This treaty with the Delaware Indians
guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Delaware lands, established trade
relations, and even contemplated the possibility of an Indian state joining the
new confederation at some point in the future.42
TheArticles of Confederation provided for centralized regulation of Indian
affairs by the Continental Congress.43 After the revolution ended, however,
35. Id. at 5-6.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 5.
38. BERGER, supra note 17, at 62.
39. ZINN, supra note 1, at 124.
40. Id.; FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 10 (1975).
41. PRUCHA, supra note 40, at 72 (citing HERBERT APrHEKAR, THE EARLY YEARS OF THE
REPUBLIC: FROM THE END OF THE REVOLUTION TO THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION OF WASHING-
TON (1783-1793) (1976)).
42. COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, TREATIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE SEVERAL INDIAN TRIBES, FROM 1778 TO 1837, at 3 (Kraus Reprint Co., 1975)
(1837).
43. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, cl. 4 (U.S. 1781) ("The United States in Congress
shall also have the sole and exclusive power of... regulating the trade and managing all affairs
with the Indians, not members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State
within its own limits be not infringed or violated .... ").
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New York, North Carolina, and Georgia resisted federal control of what they
saw as internal issues. The Continental Congress was unable to secure
approval for a proposal to limit white encroachment onto Indian lands, and
they settled instead on a provision restraining alienation (i.e., forbidding
settlement) of Indian lands outside of state boundaries without the express
approval of Congress."
The ubiquitous debate over the rights of the immigrants to Indian land rose
again during the period in which relationships among the several states were
being established." Was discovery enough to justify usurping Indian
territory? Did the successful occupation of Indian lands by the colonists
secure their claim to the land? Did the colonists' conquest over the Indians in
battle give them title to the land? Were reparations to the Indians required for
taking their territory? The Continental Congress appointed a committee to
discuss these issues. The committee concluded "that it has long been the
opinion of the country, supported by Justice and humanity, that the Indians
have just claims to all lands occupied by and not fairly purchased from
them."'
C. The Constitutional Period (1789-1803)
During this period, aboriginal claims to land were embroiled in a
developing controversy between the states and the new federal government.
This debate was to become the first constitutional issue relating to the Indians
considered by the Supreme Court. Early uncertainty and ambiguity account
for the numerous Native American land claims which continue to this day.
The Congress acted quickly to bring Indian Affairs under the ambit of its
authority. The Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790" prohibited the sale of any
Indian land to any person or state unless done so through the treaty process
of the United States.48 The new government thereby replicated the policy of
the British Royal Proclamation of 1763.' The Act was amended or supple-
mented seven times" as the government reinterpreted the policies established
by its treaties with the Indians and as the fledgling country struggled against
the flood of white immigration in its efforts to enforce the Act."1 The Act
had established a system that simply proved to be unworkable. Too many
44. 25 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 602 (Sept. 22, 1783)
(Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1904-37).
45. BERGER, supra note 17, at 73-74.
46. 33 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 457 (Aug. 3, 1787)
(Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. 1904-37).
47. Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137 (current versions in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. & 25 U.S.C.).
48. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 138.
49. BERGER, supra note 17, at 70.
50. 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, 1817, 1822, 1834.
51. BERGER, supra note 17, at 70.
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white settlers wanted what the Indians had - land. They also did not want
to wait for the wheels of the federal bureaucracy to turn.
Father Francis Paul Prucha, a political and native historian, has described
the following fundamental elements of the federal Indian program at this time:
(1) Protection of Indian rights to their land by setting definite
boundaries for the Indian Country, restricting the whites from
entering the area except under certain controls, and removing
illegal intruders.
(2) Control of the disposition of Indian lands by denying the
right of private individuals or local governments to acquire land
from the Indians by purchase or by other means.
(3) Regulation of the Indian trade by determining the condi-
tions under which individuals might engage in the trade, prohibit-
ing certain classes of traders, and actually entering into the trade
itself.
(4) Control of the liquor traffic by regulating the flow of
intoxicating liquor into the Indian Country and then prohibiting it
altogether.
(5) Provision for the punishment of crimes committed by
members of one race against the other and compensation for
damages suffered by one group at the hands of the other, in order
to remove the occasions for private retaliation which led to
frontier hostilities.
(6) Promotion of civilization and education among the Indians,
in the hope that they might be absorbed into the general stream
of American society.52
These goals constituted the foundation of federal government relations with
the Indians. Prodigious effort was expended to establish fixed territorial lines
between Indian Country and non-Indian holdings, but the borders fluctuated
dramatically. After illegal white settlements were established on Indian land,
the federal government negotiated a new grant from the Indians to the United
States. As new issues emerged, different aspects of these elements were
emphasized and new treaties were drafted and ratified.
The changing policies regarding Indian land were also, in part, governed
by simple facts. In 1790, slightly less than 4,000,000 whites occupied the
Eastern seaboard of the United' States. Fifty years later there were 13,000,000
immigrant non-Indians, 4,500,000 of which had crossed the crest of the
Appalachians in violation of the inherited agreement between the Indians and
52. FRANCIS P. PRuCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 2-3 (1962),
cited in CLINTON Er AL., supra note 14, at 143.
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the British made eighty years earlier. Clearly, population growth of this
magnitude required an expanding land base.53
The purchase of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 provided some desperately
needed land and eliminated competition from France on this continent.
Unfortunately, much of this land was presently occupied by Indians who had
been pushed off their ancestral homelands in the East. Congress enacted
legislation authorizing the president to exchange land with a tribe living east
of the Mississippi for lands the United States did not want west of the
Mississippi. This solution seemed obvious, but difficulties in coercing the
Indians to cooperate were to drag on for decades.
D. The Removal Period (1803-1861)
With the French out of the country and the English defeated in the War of
1812,' the Indians were the only remaining competition for territorial
resources in the East. In order for whites to enjoy the benefit of the property
purchased by President Thomas Jefferson, the Indians would have to leave.
The idea of collecting the Indians into a state or states of their own persisted
as a solution."
The removal process began diplomatically. The 1817 Treaty with the
Cherokees 6 provided that they trade their present lands for territory on the
Arkansas and White rivers. This treaty, and others of the period,' introduced
a new aspect to treaty making with the Indians. The government discovered
that treaties could be used to divide the Indians amongst themselves. By
destroying communal ownership of land and creating internal competition for
land grants that were only awarded to "friendly" tribes or sub-sets of tribes,
the federal government could educate the Indians in the civilizing aspects of
competition as well as limit their ability to unite. Diplomatic efforts also
preserved the foundation of legitimate title to Indian land if the government
could show that it had been ceded voluntarily.
Three seminal Supreme Court decisions during this period, Johnson v.
M'Intosh," Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,59 and Worcester v. Georgia,'
53. "[W]hen the eighteenth century was drawing to its close, less than 5000 native people
remained alive in all of eastern Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana com-
bined .... " STANNARD, supra note 2, at 121.
54. The War of 1812 was the last war in which the Indian nations participated militarily in
the contest between European nations vying for control of North America. BERGER, supra note
17, at 64.
55. Id. at 69.
56. July 8, 1817, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 156.
57. Treaty with the Choctaws, Oct. 8, 1820, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, 7 Stat. 210; Treaty with
the Creeks, Feb. 12, 1825, U.S.-Creek Nation, 7 Stat. 237; Treaty with the Creeks, Jan. 24, 1826,
U.S.-Creek Nation, 7 Stat. 286; Treaty with the Western Cherokee, May 6, 1828, U.S.-Cherokee
Nation, 7 Stat. 311; Treaties with the Delawares, Aug. 3, 1829 & Sept. 24, 1829, U.S.-Delaware
Indians, 7 Stat. 326, 327; Treaty with the Choctaw, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, Sept. 27, 1830,7 Stat.
333, 340. These treaties are cited in CLINTON Er AL., supra note 14, at 145.
58. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823):
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authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, established the relationship between
the Indian nations and the federal government.
The first case, Johnson v. M'Intosh,' settled, for America, the relationship
between discovery and title. Marshall acknowledged that the United States'
claims to the land were, for the most part, predicated on conquest of the
Native Americans, not voluntary succession.' The issue was whether the
Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians held title to land that was freely alienable.
Justice Marshall found that the rights of the original inhabitants were
necessarily impaired by European development saying:
[The natives] were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it,
and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily
diminished and their power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the fundamental
principle that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made
it.
The economic vitality and structure of the United States was at stake in this
case; to have found that the Indians did hold valid title would have undercut
the entire market for the land companies flourishing at the time. The Court
refused to uphold the transfers made by the Indians and thereby established
the rule that the United States can determine what Indians can and cannot do
with their land.
The second case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,' defined the character of
the Indian Nations relative to the federal government and set in motion an
understanding of Native Americans as subjugated peoples. The case focused
on the nature and extent of Indian sovereignty. After the State of Georgia
annexed the federally established land they also dissolved all the Cherokee
organs of government. When one Cherokee man was indicted for the murder
of another the state supreme court held that Georgia criminal courts and not
the Cherokee tribal courts had jurisdiction because the Cherokee "savages"
could not, by definition, have a lawful grant.' Marshall summarized the
issue of the case by asking, "Do the Cherokees constitute aforeign state in the
sense of the constitution?"' Marshall held that they were not foreign states,
59. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
60. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
61. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
62. M"Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 574.
63. A1
64. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
65. BERGER, supra note 17, at 76 (citing Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 19).
66. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16 (emphasis added).
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but rather "domestic dependent nations."' He described their relationship
with the United States as resembling "that of a ward to his guardian."' This
description led to the "trust relationship" later accepted between the United
States and the Indian nations. Because the Cherokees were neither a state
admitted to the Union nor a foreign state, Article I, Section 2 of the
Constitution did not give the Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear the case. The
fact that Marshall described this "state of pupilage" as between the Indians
and the federal government indicated who was to win the federal/state conflict
operating behind the facts of this case.
The third case, Worcester v. Georgia, originated from a Georgia criminal
prosecution of four religious missionaries who deliberately broke a law
requiring them to have a state license to live on Indian lands. Recall that the
state had annexed the Indian territory and required the Cherokee Indians who
lived there to submit to Georgia law. Marshall found that the Georgia laws
were an unconstitutional interference with the treaty relationships established
between the Cherokee Nations and the United States, and, therefore, reversed
the Georgia judgment." Marshall described the Indian relationship with the
federal government as follows: "[B]y declaring treaties already made, as well
as those to be made, to be the Supreme law of the land, has adopted and
sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian nations, and consequently
admits their rank among those powers who are capable of making treaties."'"
Marshall analogized the Indian nations to small European nations who sought
the protection of greater powers.n By this reasoning, the laws of Georgia
could have no force on Cherokee territory.73
The State of Georgia correctly understood, however, that President Andrew
Jackson, veteran of military campaigns against the Indians, would not interfere
in state assertion of authority over the tribes.74 A constitutional crisis,
prompted when Jackson refused to execute the judgment of the Supreme
Court, was only narrowly averted. To avoid the embarrassment and ensuing
conflict, the Court simply ended its session and put off the issue because an
improper writ was issued. The case did not overrule M'Intosh or Cherokee
67. Id. at 17.
68. Id.
69. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
70. Id. at 557-58.
71. Id. at 558.
72. Id. at 560.
73. Id.
74. Jackson is purported to have said in response to Marshall's judgment in the Worcester
decision: "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." 1 HORACE GREELEY,
THE AMERICAN CONFLICr: A HISTORY OF THE GREAT REBELLION IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1860-64, at 106 (Hartford, O.D. Case & Co.; Chicago, G. & C.W. Sherwood, 1864-66),
cited in CLINTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 28.
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Nation, but it did affirm Indian sovereignty by accepting some limited
jurisdiction supremacy for Indians on Indian land.
The affirmation was not to last long, however. The Choctaws, Chickasaws,
and Creeks had already given in to removal pressure. The Seminoles had lost
their desperate attempt to fight off the white military. The Cherokees had not
fought back, but had resisted removal by trying to adapt to the white way,
taking on European political structures and styles of living. When the
pressures on their land became too great, their government was dissolved,
their newspaper was suppressed, and their land was given away." Their
experience in Georgia was repeated. They were summoned to sign a removal
treaty in 1836,6 but only five hundred of the seventeen thousand Cherokees
showed up for the signing. The treaty was signed in any case, ratified by the
Senate, and the Cherokees were rounded up and pushed westward."
Estimates are that 4000 to 8000 people died on what came to be known as the
Trail of Tears.78
In a speech to Congress in December 1838, President Martin Van Buren
said: "It affords sincere pleasure to apprise the Congress of the entire removal
of the Cherokee Nation of Indians to their new homes west of the Mississippi.
The measures authorized by Congress at its last session have had the happiest
effects."' The policy of removal of Indians to areas beyond state lines lasted
until at least 1861.
E. The Reservation System (1861-1887)
The period of time between 1830 and 1855 was a time of tremendous
growth for this young country. By 1853, the present boundaries of the United
States were established and people were moving west. The settlers moved
through the Great Plains and into California in search of gold and land,
manifestly destined to conquer all human and geographic obstacles to
development of the "new" lands. The pressure on the Indians, who had been
"removed" to the Great Plains states, increased.
As California's population increased, federal agents experimented with the
creation of smaller Indian land holdings within the state in exchange for
guarantees of territorial permanence, social services, and guarantees of self-
governance.' Congress withheld immediate approval of these "reservations,"
because they departed from the removal policy, but despite the vastly
increased size of the country, land was becoming scarce. Finally, the Enabling
75. STANNARD, supra note 2, at 122.
76. Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478.
77. STANNARD, supra note 2, at 123.
78. BBRGER, supra note 17, at 86; see also STANNARD, supra note 2, at 124.
79. ZINN, supra note 1, at 144-46.
80. BERGER, supra note 17, at 87.
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Act for the Kansas Territory"1 established a policy of respect for the
jurisdictional integrity of the Indian lands within the state.
This Act established a pattern whereby newly admitted states would
renounce jurisdiction over the Indians, and would grant the Indians some
independent sovereignty for activities occurring on their own lands. The
states, in turn, received vast land holdings that had previously been promised
to the Indians in perpetuity. Most of the famous Indian battles during this
time occurred as the government attempted to force Indians onto reservation
lands or to keep them there.'
Under the reservation system, other aspects of Indian life began to change
as well. In 1871, the government ended all treaty making with the Indian
tribes. 3 In 1882, Secretary of the Interior, Henry M. Teller, initiated a policy
to end Indian religious ceremonies and later to imprison Indians engaging in
traditional rites.' In 1885, the Congress passed the Major Crimes Act,'
providing federal court jurisdiction over seven enumerated crimes committed
by Indians on or off Indian reservations.' For the first time, this statute
provided federal jurisdiction over intratribal affairs." Much of previously
settled Indian policy began to be reconsidered during the 1880s.
F. Allotment and Assimilation (1887-1934)
The importance of the Dawes Act8 is difficult to overestimate.89 Its
purpose was intimately tied to the view that promoting Indian separatism was
not working, and the solution to the "Indian problem" was to turn them into
"white people." Aboriginal people still combat this problem today, as do other
minority cultures in contact with a dominant culture.
The following policy objectives guided legal developments during this
period in 1877: (1) assimilation of the Indians to white economic life through
termination of communal ownership of land, (2) elimination of the Indian
community, culture, and political structure, and (3) coercion of the Indians to
81. Ch. 20, 12 Stat. 126 (1861).
82. BERGER, supra note 17, at 87-92.
83. Act of Mar. 3, 1871 (Appropriations Act), ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified in
part at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988)).
84. Sharon L. O'Brien, A Legal Analysis of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, in
THE HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 28 (Christopher T. Vecsey ed.,
1991) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
85. Act of Mar. 3, 1885 (Appropriations Act), ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988)).
86. Id.
87. CLINTON Er AL., supra note 14, at 148.
88. General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119,24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 354, 381 (1988)) (named after Sen. Henry L.
Dawes (D.-Mass.), who advocated its passage).
89. BERGER, supra note 17, at 102.
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adopt habits of civilized life exhibited by the white race.' The Dawes Act
is directly related to the first two of these objectives and indirectly related to
the third.
Previously, all Indian land had been assigned to the tribes and generally
held in common. The Dawes Act assigned particular parcels of sixty-four
hectares of land to each family head of household and thirty-two hectares to
each single person over eighteen years of age in each tribe." These parcels
were to be permanent, could be passed on through inheritance, and were
inalienable for twenty-five years.' The Act aimed to induce the Native
Americans to adopt a European, profit-generating agrarian lifestyle, instead
of their traditional, more communal, and subsistence-based life. The early
allotment efforts had been predicated on voluntary acceptance of these terms,
but the Act anticipated coercing the Indians to accept allotment and the
eventually dissolving the tribes and the reservations.93 The Act envisioned
that the Indians would become subject to state law at the end of the
inalienation period and provided that any lands not distributed through the
allotment process would be ceded to the federal government.' The govern-
ment sold those lands to anxious white settlers.
During the first twenty-five years of the allotment program, the Indians lost
almost two-thirds of their previous land holdings and eighty-seven percent of
their "good land,"95 through government sales of "surplus" land and fraudu-
lent land deals with whites. Much of this land passed to non-Indian owners
through state property tax foreclosures." President Theodore Roosevelt
claimed thht the Act would be "a mighty pulverizing engine to break up the
tribal mass."' Despite previous treaties promising political autonomy and
territorial permanency, the government openly aimed to destroy the Native
American society.
The second and third goals were primarily achieved through educational
and religious reorientation. Federally administered schools and religious
education instructed Indians in the habits of civilized life. Boarding schools
were an important instrument for effecting assimilation."6 Native American
90. EDWARD H. SPICER, THE AMERICAN INDIANS 183-90 (1980).
91. BERGER, supra note 17, at 102.
92. Though the Secretary of the Interior and many statutes which followed created shorter
restraints on alienation. The history of the Menaminee reservation is a famous example of the
resulting "checkerboard" effect.
93. BERGER, supra note 17, at 102.
94. Id.
95. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 152. The amount went from 138 million acres to 48
million acres. Id. Of the remaining 48 million acres, 20 million were desert or semi-desert. Id.
96. BERGER, supra note 17, at 103.
97. President Theodore Roosevelt, Mesage to the Senate and House of Representatives (Dec.
3, 1901), in 10 A COMPILATION OFTHE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OFTHE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1908,
at 450 (James D. Richardson ed., 1902).
98. O'Brien, International Law, supra note 26, at 79.
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children were taken from their parents, sometimes after federal officials
threatened to withhold food rations if the parents did not cooperate, and sent
to schools where they learned English, practiced white cultural traditions, and
were taught that Indian culture was inferiorY Oftentimes the children were
sent to live with white families during the summer so that they would not be
influenced by their parents to pick up Indian ways."°° Christian religious
groups were also active in the schools and on the reservations recruiting
Indians to their systems and denigrating Indian religious practices.
The second and third goals were also implemented in a series of institu-
tions created by regulations of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).'0' The
BIA created Courts of Indian Offenses and an Indian Service of the Bureau
Police. Both served to create an alternative power structure within the Indian
community to compete with the traditional tribal organization. The Code of
Indian Offenses implemented by the Bureau Police and Courts of Indian
Offenses proscribed many traditional Indian cultural and religious practic-
es."~ Through these two institutions and others like them, 3 white political
relations made great inroads into Indian life.
BIA administrators assumed that, after adopting the way of life of the
white people, the Indians would shed their culture and meld into the white
culture as the European immigrant groups had done. The one major difference
between the immigrants and the Indians, however, was that the immigrants
had voluntarily left their own communities, cultures, and homeland in search
of what they considered to be better opportunities in the United States. The
Indians never made that choice. 4
The last major legislation of the period conferred citizenship on all
"noncitizen" Indians born within the United States. 5 The Indian nations that
survived allotment now found themselves assimilated by the dictates of the
occupying power. The assimilation campaign was officially complete, but the
inadequacies and injustice of the previous fifty years began to become more
manifest. A report sponsored by the Brookings Institute," however,
concluded that "the assimilation campaign had failed to realize its objectives
and that the Indians lived in conditions of extreme poverty, with poor health
99. Id.
100. See SPICER, supra note 90, at 188.
101. Created in 1824.
102. CLINTON Er AL., supra note 14, at 151.
103. Legislation such as the Act of June 28, 1898 (Curtis Act), ch. 542, 30 Stat. 567, which
dissolved the Cherokee and Choctaw tribal governments as legal institutions, also combined to
affect change in Indian life.
104. BERGER, supra note 17, at 151.
105. Act of June 2, 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
106. See INSTITUTE FOR Gov'T RESEARCH, STUDIES IN ADMINISTRATION, THE PROBLEM OF
INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (Lewis Merriam et al. ed., 1928). This work is popularly known as the
Merriam Report.
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and inadequate education." 7 The BIA, under John Collier as Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, reflected the changing attitudes toward Indians that began
to arise. Collier abolished official prohibitions against Indian religious
practices and instituted other reforms that helped to ease government
discrimination against Indians. 1"8 Slowly, the situation began to improve.
G. The Reorganization Act Period (1934-1940)
If the allotment and assimilation period marked the nadir of the relationship
between the Native American peoples and the federal government, then the
period which followed indicated a general improvement. The Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA)"0 formalized a rejection of the policies that had
guided Indian policy for more than fifty years. "By 1934, there was a sense
that something very serious was wrong with the direction of federal policy
based on the [Dawes] Act and the principles that undergirded it.""' When
President Franklin Roosevelt chose John Collier as Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, a new era of Indian policy began. The new system implemented
policies reflecting Marshall's emphasis on allowing the Indians to govern
themselves within their own territory and allowed the tribes to choose to adopt
new institutions based on the model of a liberal, European, constitutional
democracy. The sense of choice was limited, however. Some of the tribes
experienced substantial pressure to accept the IRA and the consequences of
refusing to vote whether or not to accept it were severe."'
The Act ended land allotments and authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to purchase additional lands for Indian use. Further, it required that timber
harvesting on Indian lands be designed with the goal of long-term yield, rather
than the quick gains brought by clear cutting. The decision about whether or
not to harvest remained with the federal government, not the Indians. One of
the most important provisions of the IRA allowed the Indian tribes to develop
constitutions and corporate charters. Even though these constitutions and the
corporate structure were established on white terms, the limited autonomy
they brought revived the sense of tribal government and control. These
corporations developed widely and became instruments of social change in the
tribes."' Irrigation systems were built, communally owned cattle herds were
established, and the exploration of mineral and oil resources began. Not all
of the changes "development" generated were positive, but some good effects
did come as a result.
107. SPICER, supra note 90, at 189-90.
108. See O'Brien, International Law, supra note 26, at 28.
109. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (Wheeler-Howard Act), ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988 & Supp. 111990)).
110. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 152.
111. See Wheeler-Howard Act - Exempt Certain Indians: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Indian Affairs on S. 2103, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 22 (1940).
112. SI'ICER, supra note 90, at 193.
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Importantly, IRA also defined the term, "Indian," which established the
following qualification for election, acceptance, and benefits under the Act:
The term 'Indian' as used in [the IRA] shall include all persons of
Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe
now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descen-
dants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing
within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall
further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood.
For the purposes of [the Act], Eskimos and other aboriginal
peoples of Alaska shall be considered Indians."3
Eventually, 258 tribal elections were held to decide whether or not to accept
the Act. A total of 181 tribes, including 129,750 individual Indians, accepted
organization under the Act. Seventy-seven tribes, with 86,365 Indians,
rejected it."' IRA and its effects marked a new era in Indian affairs.
H. The Termination Era (1940-1962)"5
The controversy between assimilation and autonomy was not ended by the
IRA. Within Congress there was strong support for the notions that reserva-
tions were places of forced internment that should be closed, and that America
should cease to deal with the Indians differently from any other minority
group. In the name of freeing tribes from federal supervision, Congress
undertook a policy "terminating""' 6 the special relationship between the
Native Americans and the United States.
House of Representatives Concurrent Resolution 108.. states that the
policy of Congress was that the Indians should be treated identically with all
other citizens. Several tribes were "designated""' as subjects of study, the
end result of which was legislation placing the individuals of the tribes fully
under state authority. Eventually, 109 tribes were terminated; 1,362,155 acres
of reservation land and 11,466 Indians were affected, comprising 3% of all
federally managed Indians and 3.2% of the trust land."9 Congress also
113. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1988)
114. CUNTON Er AL., supra note 14, at 154.
115. For a comprehensive analysis of this period, see DONALD FIxfCO, TERMINATION AND
RELOCATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY, 1945-1960 (1986).
116. Act of June 17, 1954 (Termination Act), ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250, 252 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (1970) (repealed 1973)), stated that "all statutes of the United
States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be applicable to the
members of the tribe.. .. " Id., cited in Sharon L. O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does
the United States Maintain a Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1461, 1471 n.49 (1991)
[hereinafter O'Brien, Tribes & Indians].
117. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., Ist Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
118. Id. The Flathead, the Klamath, the Menominee, the Potowatamie, and the Chippewa.
119. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 158.
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adopted Public Law 280,2 which transferred jurisdiction over crimes and
civil causes of action previously held by federal and tribal authorities to the
states.1
2 1
L Assertions of Sovereignty (1962-Present)
In recent years court decisions and congressional enactments have
diminished the impact of termination. Two terminated tribes, the Menominee
and Klamath, challenged the termination of fishing and hunting rights that
conflicted with treaty provisions." The Supreme Court held that the
termination legislation did not abrogate their tribe's treaty rights. Congress has
restored some tribes to federal recognition and included other terminated
tribes in benefit programs aimed at federally recognized tribes."
Native Americans benefitted in the 1960s from President Lyndon Johnson's
War on Poverty and from legislation that gave Indians the opportunity to sue
in federal court." In the 1970s, Native Americans challenged infringement
of land, hunting, and fishing rights in court. They challenged federal authority
more directly by taking over the Bureau of Indian Affairs Office in Washing-
ton in 1972 and by resisting police control at Wounded Knee in 1973. The
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968"s also gave Indians guarantees under the
Bill of Rights that they had not previously known, including federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction, and retrocession of Public Law 280 jurisdiction to the
federal government.'" Though this Act has been very controversial in the
Native American community, it permitted Indians to raise individual and
collective rights claims in federal court. Also passed during this time were the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 197527 and the
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978," which strengthened the role of the
tribes in making decisions about their members.
120. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (Pub. L. No. 83-280) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
121. Id.
122. See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1967); Kimball v.
Callahan, 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974).
123. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988 & Supp. 111990)); Indian Health Care Improvement Act, Pub, L. No.
94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); Indian Education Act,
Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 334 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). These
authorities are cited in O'Brien, Tribes & Indians, supra note 116, at 1472 nn. 50-52.
124. Act of Oct. 10, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-635,80 Stat. 880 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1362
(1988)) (making court challenges possible).
125. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1988)).
126. CLINTON Er AL, supra note 14, at 160.
127. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n
(1988)).
128. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988 & Supp. 111990).
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These assertions of sovereignty and statutory gains in autonomy reawak-
ened latent questions about the nature of federal trust responsibility for
Indians. Because Justice Marshall's infamous guardian/ward characterization
was formalized in the Dawes Act, requiring the federal government to
administer the allotment process for the benefit of Indian land recipients, a
trust relationship between the government and the Indians developed. The
government was seen as the trustee of a body of assets to which the Indians
were entitled and for which they needed the administrative capacities of the
federal government. The government, through the Department of the Interior
and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, argued that this trust relationship only
extended to property and only for federally recognized tribes. 9 In 1974, the
National Tribal Council claimed that the trust responsibility included not only
these obligations, but also the requirement that the federal government protect
the sovereignty of the Indian tribes."' Some scholars have noted that the
trust responsibility works both for and against Native American sovereignty
efforts.' Care by a trustee allows a beneficiary to enforce her rights to trust
assets, but it also necessarily entails a strong sense of control and paternalism.
The sword cuts both ways.
In the later part of the 1970s, Native Americans and Native American
policy experienced a backlash against what were viewed as excesses of the
1960s. Citizens groups, such as the Montanans Opposed to Discrimination
and the Interstate Congress for Equal Rights and Responsibilities, lobbied
Congress to return to the assimilation policies of the past. Bills were
introduced calling for a reevaluation of Indian law, limitations on hunting and
fishing rights, and even an end to all treaties entered into with the Indians by
the United States.'32
These groups and the change of political agenda that took place in the
1980s set the stage for an increased focus on the financial relationship
between the government and the Indians. President Ronald Reagan, in an
effort to limit federal expenditures for Indian support, issued a Statement on
Indian Policy proclaiming that "[i]t is important to the concept of self-
government that tribes reduce their dependence on Federal funds by providing
a greater percentage of the cost of their self-government."'33 This policy,
however, may be little more than the "termination" wolf in the "sovereignty"
sheep's clothing. Congress, nonetheless, called for extensive economic
129. FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND
THE AMERICAN INDIANS 399 (1984).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 400.
132. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 162.
133. President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Indian Policy (Jan. 24, 1983), in [1983] 1 PuB.
PAPERS 96-97.
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development on the reservations, though the tribes were expected to provide
most of the capital to fund this development.
Since President Richard Nixon's famous call for congressional support of
Indian autonomy efforts,"3 all subsequent presidents have, with varying
degrees of credibility, asserted interest in developing Native American self-
governance measures. After a meeting with indigenous leaders President
George Bush stated, "Today we move forward toward a permanent relation-
ship of understanding and trust, a relationship in which the tribes of the nation
sit in positions of sovereignty along with other governments that compose the
family that is America."'35 A project was initiated in 1988 by Congress to
support a test group of tribes who participate in a three-year attempt at self-
governance. Although the tribes must still negotiate with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs for their funding, their relationship approximates that of one sovereign
to another.
Conditions on the reservations today, however, are still not good. Estimates
are that unemployment on the reservations runs as high as 80% and
alcoholism is nearly as widespread. The average annual income is less than
$7000. Nonetheless, there is hope among the tribes who have joined the self-
determination project' that new jobs, better schools, and a new pride in
Indian culture will be engendered by a return to self-governance.
The Native Americans continue to face many struggles today. The
extermination policies have ended and their children are no longer being
forced into boarding schools, but the challenges of alcoholism, unemployment,
and the battle to maintain their culture are all very real. One of the greatest
threats to the Native American community continues to be the assault on their
spiritual practices. This assault is no longer military but is instead legal. The
stakes, however, are just as high. The following sections discuss the general
environment of protection of religious rights in the United States and a focus
on how the standards continue to work to the detriment-of Native Americans.
I. Constitutional Protection of Religion
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. ,3 These two clauses of the First
134. President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs (July 8,
1970), 1970 PuB. PAPERS 564, 576, cited in PRUCHA, supra note 129, at 379 ("We have concluded
that Indians will get better programs and that public monies will be more effectively expended if
the people who are most affected by these programs are responsible for operating them,").
135. Martha Williams, Some Native Americans Begin Pushfor Self-Determination, SEATrLE
TIMEs, June 30, 1991, at Al.
136. Seven tribes are currently participating: in Washington, the Quinault Indian Nation, the
Jamestown Klallam Tribe, the Lummi Indian Tribe; in California, the Hoopa Valley Tribe; in
Oklahoma, the Absentee-Shawnee Tribe, the Cherokee Tribe; and in Minnesota, the Mille Lacs
Chippewa.
137. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Amendment are collectively known as the Religion Clauses and individually
known as the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. These parts
of the First Amendment have been made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Each clause can be implicated by government
action that either helps or hinders religion. In the context of Native American
religious freedom, Indians claim that the government has violated these
constitutional protections when a government action has unduly burdened their
spiritual practices. Generally, a free exercise claim is at issue, but occasional-
ly the government will claim that even if a free exercise violation is found the
requested government accommodation of Native American spiritual practice
would amount to an Establishment Clause violation. "There is a natural
antagonism between a command not to establish religion and a command not
to inhibit its practice." '39 A principle of "neutrality" has guided the Court's
analysis of Religion Clause claims, but, as this article will show, neutrality
has worked almost without exception to the detriment of Native Americans.
The next section outlines the standards and method of analysis employed by
courts in these cases.
A. The Establishment Clause
Most of the religious rights issues that arise involve the second part of the
"Religion Clauses" of the Constitution, rather than the first. Establishment
Clause analysis is implicated, however, when the government improperly
involves itself in support of a particular religious group. In the Native
American context, Establishment Clause issues arise when courts worry that
the protection they are asked to afford Indian religious practices require that
the government be more than neutral toward Native American spirituality.
The traditional Establishment Clause standards are set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman." In Lemon, the Court established a three-part test for determin-
ing the validity of state statutes granting financial aid to church related
schools. The law in question must: (1) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2)
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid
excessive government entanglement with religion. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor has called for a reformulation of the Establishment Clause test that
would put the court in the position of an "objective observer.""' Her two-
prong test would first ask whether the court has "endorsed" a particular
138. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1. 14-15 (1947), reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855
(1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
139. JOHN E. NOWAK Er AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1031 (1986).
140. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
141. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,76 (1985) (holding that an Alabama statue authorizing
a period of silence of meditation or voluntary prayer violated the Establishment Clause
requirement of neutrality toward religion). The Supreme Court has recently announced its
intention to reevaluation the Lemon test by accepting certiorari of Grumet v. Board of Educ., 618
N.E.2d 94 (N.Y. 1993), cert. denied, 62 U.S.L.W. 3368 (Nov. 29, 1993).
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religion or religious belief.42 The second prong of her test would investigate
whether the challenged statute requires the government to become excessively
entangled with religious institutions.' Though this test seems to be gaining
favor on the Court in recent years, it has not yet become the standard of
analysis.'"
In the 1992 term, the Supreme Court further muddied the already turbid
waters of Establishment Clause analysis by refusing to reconsider Lemon
while affirming the unconstitutionality of a rabbinical prayer at a public
middle school graduation ceremony. By a 5-4 majority, the Court held in Lee
v. Weisman145 that a school could not provide for a "nonsectarian" prayer to
be led by a member of the clergy selected by the school." The Court held
that the conduct of the school principal, in deciding that an invocation and
benediction should be given and in selecting a religious participant, constituted
state action.'47 The Court languished over the "state-imposed character of an
invocation and benediction by clergy selected by the school' "4 and found
that the "conformity required of the student in this case was too high an
exaction to withstand the test of the Establishment Clause."'1
49
After acknowledging the "delicate and fact-sensitive" character of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
majority, clearly limited this decision to the school graduation context.'"
Despite his characterization of the decision, however, scholarship has already
noted the Court's snub of the Lemon test analysis in favor of an expanded
focus on coercion as a determinative principal."' Whether this change
portends a reinvigorated future for the Establishment Clause or is the
harbinger of further confusion remains to be seen. For Native American
religious freedom, the situation could not get much worse.
Courts evaluating Native American free exercise claims have found
Establishment Clause problems when asked to protect religious freedom on
government lands.' 2 In Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United
142. Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990).
143. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (holding that the inclusion of a
nativity scene in a city display does not violate the Establishment Clause).
144. Laurence H. Tribe, Comments on Proposed Legislation to Protect Native American
Religious Freedom, Memorandum to Native American Tribal Leaders and Academics Meeting
at Harvard Divinity School (Nov. 13, 1990) (on file with author).
145. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
146. Id. at 2655.
147. Id. at 2655-56.
148. Id. at 2660.
149. Id. at 2661.
150. Id.
151. See The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 163, 259
(1992).
152. Though not in a Native American rights context, the Supreme Court's statement in Lee
v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992), tells the tale. The Court said, "The principle that
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States,' the court observed that the Inupiat claims sought to deprive the
public of normal use of the seas at issue and therefore created serious
Establishment Clause problems. The court in Crow v. Gullet" noted that
other courts had expressed concern about affording special treatment to
Indians and so becoming excessively entangled with religion.' Not all
courts have shared this concern One court found that "where government
action violates the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause ordinarily
does not bar judicial relief."'"
Because the bulk of Native American Religion Clause claims are based on
a perceived threat to the right to freely engage in their spiritual practices, the
next section delves into the specific details of free exercise jurisprudence in
some detail.
B. Free Exercise Jurisprudence in American History
The framers of the Bill of Rights gave the protection of religious freedom
priority in their list of protections which citizens reserved for themselves in
this country. The objective of this First Amendment was unqualified federal
government neutrality regarding religious beliefs and governmental accommo-
dation of religious practices where its actions burdened them.'" Since the
Fourteenth Amendment extended this protection to the states, state action has
generated most of the conflict between government interests and the rights of
individuals to practice their religious beliefs freely. A brief survey of the
history of free exercise jurisprudence reveals three prominent perspectives..
1. Belief and Practice
In the first free exercise case, Reynolds v. United States,' the Supreme
Court upheld an anti-polygamy law against the claim of a Mormon plaintiff
that his religious beliefs required such marriages. The Court stated that
"Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was
left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive
of good order.""9 Because polygamy was in "violation of social duties" and
government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause." Id. at 2655.
153. 548 F. Supp. 182, 189 (D. Alaska 1982), aff'd, 746 F.2d 570 (1984).
154. 541 F. Supp. 785, 794 (D.C. S.D. 1982).
155. Id. at 794 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 263 (1981)).
156. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 747 (1983) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
220-21 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963)).
157. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449-50 (1971). "[W]hen government activities
touch on the religious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and
neutral in primary impact." Id. at 450.
158. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
159. Id. at 164.
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subversive of good order,'"" Congress was free to make a law to outlaw
this offensive practice, despite its infringement on the plaintiffs religious
practice.
This opinion required the government to protect only religious belief, not
religious practice. The Court reasoned that any other position would
subordinate law to religious belief allowing every citizen to construct his or
her own law'based on religious conviction. 6' After 1940, the Court
deemphasized the distinction between belief and practice and established new
standards for permissible burdens on religious practice.
In Cantwell v. Connecticut," the Court expanded protection for religious
conduct.' The Cantwell Court reversed the conviction of several Jehovah's
Witnesses for failing to obtain government approval before soliciting money.
In addition to supporting its ablolute ban on governmental interference with
beliefs," the Court held that the government could not inhibit the plaintiffs
"chosen form of religion."'" This decision protected not only the freedom
to believe, but also, in some circumstances, the freedom to act on those
beliefs.'"
Three years later, in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 7 the Court supported the Cantwell standard and rejected a
weaker test outlined in Minersville School District v. Gobitis." Acknowl-
edging that the First Amendment limited permissible government action, the
Barnette -Court recognized as valid only those restrictions on freedom of
speech arid of the press, of assembly and of worship only to the extent
necessary protect a legitimate state interest from "grave and immediate
danger. '
160. Id. at 159.
161. Id. at 166-67; see also Kenneth Main, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme
Court Alters the State of Free Exercise Doctrine 40 AMER. U.L. REv. 1431, 1436 (1991).
162. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
163. Id. at 303-04.
164. Id. at 303. This protection has been maintained throughout the history of the Court.
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (striking down a state constitutionally required
declaration of belief in God as a prerequisite for holding public office).
165. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303.
166. Id. Justice Owen Roberts stated that "[t]he first is absolute but, in the nature of things,
the second cannot be." Id. at 303-04.
167. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
168. 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624 (1943). Here, the Court supported a school board expulsion of a Jehovah's Witness who
refused to salutc the flag, finding that the expulsion was not directed at the student's belief, but
at his refusal to follow school rules. Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 594, 599-600. That decision excluded
from free exercise strict scrutiny any "general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of
religious beliefs." Id. at 594. It established a general "rational basis" test for government action
affecting religious belief. Id. at 598-600.
169. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639.
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2. Setting the Standard
The major free exercise decision of the Earl Warren Court was Sherbert
v. Verner."7 Sherbert used the two-part balancing test established in
Braunfeld v. Brown,"" which required that the plaintiff first establish that an
action of the government has burdened a sincerely held" religious be-
lief.' After the plaintiff established an infringement on religious rights, the
burden shifted to the government to show that its infringement was justified
by a compelling interest. The Court upheld a state law requiring that
businesses close on Sunday, despite the burden on merchants whose religion
also required them to rest on days other than Sunday. 74 Because this burden
was indirect in that its purpose was not to impede religious observance or
discriminate between religions, the Court found that it did not amount to a
compulsion to act contrary to religious beliefs.75
In Sherbert,"6 the Court increased the level of scrutiny applied to indirect
burdens on the free exercise of religion." The Court again rejected the
rational basis standard of review... and held that even incidental burdens on
religious practice had to be justified by a compelling state interest."7 Once
the plaintiff established the prima facie requirements of sincere belief and
burden on religion, the infringement was unconstitutional unless the
government could show that the infringement on religious practice was
justified by a compelling governmental interest which could not be protected
by less restrictive means." The Court found that even economic burdens
of the Braunfeld type amounted to "the same kind of burden.., as would a
fine imposed ... for... Sunday worship."'' .
The Court next expanded its application of the free exercise clause in
Wisconsin v. Yoder," in holding that Wisconsin could not require members
of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Mennonite Church to
send their children to school after the eighth grade." The Court followed
170. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
171. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
172. For a discussion of sincerity assessment, see John T. Noonan, How Sincere Do You
Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 713, which analyzes United States v. Ballard,
322 U.S. 78 (1944), which is the origin of sincerity assessment addressed by the Court.
173. Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606-07
174. Id. at 605-06.
175. Id.
176. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
177. Id. at 406.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 403.
180. Id. The state had to show that "no alternative forms of regulation" could pass
constitutional muster. Id. at 407.
181. Id. at 404.
182. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
183. Id. at 232-34.
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its familiar balancing test and found that the Amish and Mennonites sincerely
held a religiously-based belief that sending their children to secondary school
would expose them to worldly influences that ran counter to their religious
emphasis on different values.' Justice Warren Burger, writing for the
majority, emphasized that the Amish way of life was intimately related with
their religious beliefs."5 The Amish and Mennonites could claim an
exemption from the school obligation since they had shown that this
government behavior had a coercive effect on the practice of their religion
due to the burden it placed on that practice."
The state requirement at issue in Yoder could only be justified by a
compelling state interest in imposing modem society upon the Amish."' The
state failed to demonstrate an interest of significant importance and the Court
saw that there were less burdensome .means of achieving the state articulated
goal of training good citizens."' The Court also reasoned that the Amish
and Mennonite system of education was ideal for training their children for
life in their community. 9' This facially neutral statute was found to unduly
burden the free exercise of the Amish and Mennonite religions; the Court,
therefore, exempted Amish and Mennonite children from attending public
school beyond the eighth grade."
With these cases, the Court established the two-prong test for evaluating
indirect burdens on the free exercise of religion which exists to this day: a
plaintiff must first show that a government action coerced her to violate
religious beliefs or penalized her for a religious practice, and second prove
that those beliefs are sincere, deeply rooted in religion, and shared by others.
If both prongs are satisfied, the government bears the burden of showing a
compelling need for its action. Direct burdens on religious freedom are still
absolutely prohibited.' In recent years, however, the Court has tended to
interpret state interests broadly and individual religious interests narrowly.
3. The Scope Narrows
In United States v. Lee,' the Court denied an Amish employer's right to
refuse to withhold social security taxes from his Amish employees. Though
the Court recognized the genuine burden that participating in the social
184. ld. at 211.
185. IdL at 235-36.
186. Id. at 234.
187. Id. at 235.
188. Id. at 224-25.
189. Id. at 223.
190. Id. at 234.
191. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
192. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
193. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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security system placed on the plaintiffs religious liberty,'"' it found that
compulsory payments were necessary for the maintenance of the system and
that an exemption would be unduly difficult to administer. Efficiency in the
"social security system justified forcing Lee to comply with the law in
violation of his faith.""5 This decision marked a movement away from an
expansive view of the governmental duty to refrain from infringing upon
individual religious practices.
The Court has continued to move in that direction in recent decisions. In
Bowen v. Roy," the Court refused to exempt a Native American child from
identification by a social security number. It characterized her father's claim
as a demand that government "conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with [his] religious beliefs . . . ."' Some commentators have
suggested that this decision implies a heightened level of scrutiny by the
Court of government actions that require a choice between adherence to a
religious belief and enjoyment of a government benefit."' Those government
actions which make the practice of a particular faith more difficult or costly,
on the contrary, require a less substantial government interest to overcome
burdens to the free exercise of religion.
The Court's attack on judicial enforcement of the right to free religious
exercise continued in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith.'" In that case the Court upheld Oregon's denial of unemployment
compensation to two drug counselors who were fired from their jobs after
ingesting peyote in an annual sacramental ritual of the Native American
Church.' Consumption of peyote was a crime under Oregon law. The state
unemployment agency denied their application for benefits based on its
conclusion that they were fired for work-related misconduct. The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the denial of benefits against a free
exercise challenge, finding that if a "generally applicable and otherwise
valid"20  across-the-board criminal statute exists, any impact on a person's
ability to freely practice his or her religion is "merely the incidental
effect"' of the statute. Such an incidental effect does not violate the First
Amendment. 3 In order to "trigger free exercise balancing analysis, the
object of a criminal statute on its face must proscribe the exercise of
194. Id. at 259-61.
195. NOWAK Er AL., supra note 139, at 1078.
196. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
197. Id. at 699.
198. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITUTIONAL LAW § 14-13, at 1262-64 (2d ed.
1988).
199. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
200. Id. at 890.




Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
religion."2 "4 This holding virtually guarantees that any general criminal
statute that is opposed on free exercise grounds will not be open to balancing
by a reviewing court. As a result, the Court will never get to the question of
whether the state interest asserted is compelling enough to warrant an
infringement on religious rights, nor will the state have to show that its means
of achieving that interest are the least intrusive possible. Implicitly, the Court
is saying that any police power interest bars free exercise analysis by the
courts. 'This development leaves minority religious claims at the mercy of
majoritarian politics without the check of the judiciary.'n
The result of these sobering developments is that the First Amendment
restriction on government activities which prohibit the free exercise of religion
means:
(1) The government cannot directly act to proscribe religious belief.'
(2) To qualify for judicial review of a government action which allegedly
implicates Religion Clause protections, the claimant must show:
(a) That the religious beliefs burdened are held in good faith; and
(b) The affected religious practice is rooted in religious belief and furthers
this belief; and
(c) The practice is central or important to the practice of her or his
religion.
2"
(3) Regulation of religious conduct is permissible if the motive of the
legislation is not discriminatorily directed at religion.23
(4) Neutral civil laws or government conduct which directly burden the
ability of citizens to engage in sincere religious practices are subject to strict
scrutiny.'
(5) Neutral and generally applicable criminal laws are not open to free
exercise challenge,"0
204. John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A
Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REv. 80 (1991) (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-84).
205. Justice Harry Blackmun acknowledges, in his dissent, that the majority's instruction for
plaintiffs like these to look to the political process for redress "will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in." Smith, 494 U.S. at 890
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
206. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-04 (1961).
207. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216-19 (1972).
208. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
209. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
210. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. The Supreme Court recently applied and upheld this standard
in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993). In Hialeah, the
Court struck down a Florida statute for violating both the neutrality toward religion and general
applicability arms of the Smith test. Id. at 2226. As a result of the failure to meet those two
requirements, the enactments were given compelling interest scrutiny. Id. at 2227. The ordinances
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(6) Government actions which indirectly make it "more difficult to practice
certain religious beliefs" will not require a compelling governmental
justification, but instead some lower level of justification."'
As recently as June 24, 1992, the Supreme Court has said that "[tihe First
Amendment's Religion Clauses mean that religious beliefs and religious
expression are too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed by the
State." Nonetheless, if recent court opinions are any indication, it will be
very difficult for a plaintiff to establish a direct government burden on the
practice of religion. The current Court favors restrictions on the claims that
individuals can make on the government when it comes to protection of
religious practices. These restrictions have profoundly affected Native
American religious rights' claims.
C. The Free Exercise Clause and Native Americans
The Free Exercise Clause has been invoked by Native Americans to protect
their right to ingest sacred peyote," 3 to practice their spirituality at sacred
sites," 4 to gather and keep sacred objects,215 to hunt and fish, 16 to protect
the spirits of their children, " 7 and to express their spirituality through
traditional dress while in prison."' A complete exposition of all the Native
American free exercise cases would extend far beyond the scope of this
article. A brief survey of the impact of free exercise jurisprudence on Native
Americans follows. To further limit the scope of this analysis, this article will
only consider free exercise jurisprudence within the context of Native
American "sacred site" claims. Where these lands are claimed by the United
States government, conflicts between the government's intended use and
ceremonial use by Indians often arise.
Five cases will demonstrate the difficulties of applying the Sherbert and
Yoder tests to sacred site claims. In all these cases, Native American claims
failed the analysis required by the court. After studying these cases, one can
see that the balance is weighted against Native Americans. Even when the
religious nature of the claim is accepted, it is very difficult for an Indian
211. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
212. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656 (1992).
213. People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
214. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). See
also Lyng's ancestors and progeny.
215. United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985).
216. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
217. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
218. Standing Deer v. Carlson, 831 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1987).
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religious right to outweigh the government's interest. Ethnocentrism, 2" rather
than objective analysis, pervades judicial commentary on these decisions.
These cases can usefully be broken down into three categories." First,
in Badoni v. Higginson, the court found that the government interest out-
weighed the plaintiffs religious interest.' Second, in Sequoyah v. TVA'
and Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States (Inupiat Community
I)," the courts found that the practices which the Indians claimed to be
protected by the First Amendment were not religious.' Third, in Crow v.
Gullet2. and Wilson v. Block,' 7 the court found no burden on Native
American religious practices.m All of these cases framed their discussion
of the question presented in Sherbert and Yoder terms, but the character of the
analysis varied widely.
1. The Government's Interest Outweighs Indian Religious Claims
The creation of the Glen Canyon Dam and Reservoir, known as Lake
Powell, on the Colorado river flooded land fifty-eight miles upstream.
Eventually, these waters entered the Rainbow Bridge National Monument
which is surrounded by the Navajo reservation in southern Utah and is
managed by the National Park Service. The rising waters of Lake Powell
flooded areas previously used by the Navajo for prayer ceremonies for at least
a hundred years. The Navajo also believe that some of their gods live in the
area of Rainbow Bridge that is now underwater. Tourists have desecrated the
sacred nature of the site with graffiti, alcohol consumption, and general failure
to respect the importance of the area to Native Americans. As a result of
these changes to a once isolated and pristine area, the Navajo are no longer
able to engage in practice their spiritual practices in the area.
Among other claims, the Navajo plaintiffs in Badoni' sought declaratory
and injunctive relief for the violation of their First Amendment rights. The
trial court granted summary judgment for the government because it believed
that the plaintiffs lack of a property interest in the Monument was disposi-
219. "Ethnocentrism" is defined as: "1: Having race as a central interest 2: characterized by
or based on the attitude that one's own group is superior." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 389 (1981).
220. See Erica Rosenberg, Native American's Access to Religious Sites: Underprotected
Under the Free Exercise Clause?, 26 B.C. L. REv. 463, 475 (1985).
221. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
222. Id. at 177-78
223. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980).
224. 548 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), affid, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984) (Inupiat
Community 1).
225. Id. at 188-89.
226. 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
227. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983).
228. Crow, 706 F.2d at 858; Wilson, 708 F.2d at 746.
229. 455 F. Supp. 641 (D. Utah 1977).
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tive.no The Badoni court rejected the "no property interest" argument,'
stating that the "government must manage its property in a manner that does
not offend the Constitution." 2 It did, however, affirm the lower court
judgment for different reasons. 3
The Badoni court acknowledged the Yoder two-step free exercise
analysis. ' Though it did not explicitly state that the Native Americans had
been burdened in their religious practice, it did cite the changed circumstances
at the Monument and the destructive effects these changes had on the ability
of the Navajo to engage in their spiritual practices. 5 The court then stated,
without actually balancing the burden on the Navajo, that the government
interest in maintaining Lake Powell outweighed the religious interest of the
plaintiffs.' Any accommodation of the Navajo claims would have required
a reduction in the water level of Lake Powell. Because the court found that
maintaining the level of Lake Powell is a compelling government interest, it
did not "reach the question [of] whether the government action involved
infringe[d upon] plaintiffs' free exercise of religion.""7
The court failed to address the second part of the second prong of the
SherbertlYoder test, which requires the government to show that its compel-
ling interest cannot be satisfied by a less intrusive means. It did find that it
was "reasonable to conclude that no action other than reducing the water level
would avoid the alleged infringement of the plaintiffs' beliefs and practic-
es." 8 No argument or discussion of possible alternatives supported that
finding.
The balance was never struck in Badoni. The court cited the proper
authorities and stated the rule correctly, but failed to apply the test to the
facts. A proper adjudication of these issues would have first evaluated the
burden on religious practice and assessed whether it was sincere and
substantial. In this case, the court found that there was a substantial burden
of a sincerely held religious belief brought about by the flooding of Navajo
sacred sites. Had the court followed the SherbertlYoder test, the second step
would have studied the nature of the government's interest in its activity and
how substantial the interests involved were. Those interests would have been
weighed against a fundamental religious right to determine whether or not
there was a violation. Finally, even if the government's interest was found to
outweigh the plaintiffs religious rights, the court should have required the
230. Id. at 644-45.
231. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 176-77.
235. Id. at 177.
236. Id. at 177-78
237. Id. at 177 n.4.
238. Id. at 177.
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government to prove that its interest could not be satisfied by any less
intrusive means.
In legal realist terms, the religious rights of the Navajo lost to economic
development interests. Economic development for the benefit of the majority
outweighed the fundamental religious rights of the minority.
2. Not All That Is Claimed To Be Religious Will Be Respected As Such
Native Americans have to worry not only that their religious rights will not
be valued by the courts, but also that their actions and beliefs will not be
recognized as religious at all. Two courts failed to protect Indian religious
practices because they did not believe them to be, in fact, religious. In
Sequoyah"9 and Inupiat Community I' the courts found themselves in the
"confusing and essentially uncharted waters""I of First Amendment free
exercise law. Neither of these cases, unfortunately, did much to help clear up
these challenging issues.
Since 1965 the Cherokee Indians had been challenging the construction of
the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River in Tennessee. Like the Glen
Canyon Dam discussed above, the completion of the Tellico Dam would have
resulted in the flooding of a vast area upstream from the dam. Some of that
area included Cherokee sacred sites, prayer spots, holy places, and cemeter-
ies?'2 The Cherokee complaint stated that the Indians would "suffer injury
by the infringement of their right to worship the religion of their choice in the
manner of their choosing by the destruction of sites which they hold in
reverence .. . ." The court also noted that particular locations are more
important to Indian religions than they are to most other religions.'
Despite the Indian claims, the Sequoyah court concluded that what was at
issue was actually cultural and traditional interests and not religious
interests?' 5 It struggled with the notion that the destruction of a particular
place could deny the plaintiffs the ability to freely exercise their religion. The
court also required some sense that the contested government action inhibited
some practice or belief that was central to the plaintiffs' religion.' It stated
the following:
Granting as we do that the individual plaintiffs sincerely adhere
to a religion which honors ancestors and draws its spiritual
strength from feelings of kinship with nature, they have fallen
239. 620 F.2d 1159 (1980).
240. 543 F. Supp. 182 (D. Alaska 1982), ajffd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984).
241. Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1165 (6th Cir. 1980) (Merrit, J., dissenting),
242. Ld. at 1160.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1163.
245. Id. at 1164-65.
246. Id. at 1164.
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short of demonstrating that worship at the particular geographic
location in question is inseparable from the way of life, the
cornerstone of their religious observance, or plays a central role
in their religious ceremonies and practices. 7
The court based its interest in centrality and particularity on Wisconsin v.
Yoder," Frank v. State, 9 and People v. Woody.' The Sequoyah court
found that the impairment the Cherokee would suffer by the flooding of the
Little Tennessee Valley would be cultural, rather than religious. Because
no religious interest was threatened, the rest of the Yoder analysis did not
apply.
The Sequoyah court misconstrued the case law it used to support its
opinion. The Frank opinion expressly stated that "[i]t is sufficient that the
practice be deeply rooted in religious belief to bring it within the ambit of the
free exercise clause and place on the state its burden of justification." 2 The
Frank court decidedly rejected centrality as the standard for constitutional
review." 3
The Inupiat people faced a similar problem in their claim to title of the
Beaufort and Chukchi Seas of the Arctic Ocean. They attempted to prevent
the lease-sale of oil exploration rights in the seas that they traditionally used
for fishing and whaling. They also claimed that the government action would
deny them access to sacred sites.' Though this case was predominantly
decided on sovereignty grounds, the Inupiat were also making an important
religious exercise claim. The Ninth Circuit opinion ' is very brief and relies
heavily upon the District Court decision.m6 The religious exercise analysis
of that decision focused upon the Yoder and Sequoyah decisions.
As in Sequoyah, the Inupiat court failed to find support for the religious
character of the plaintiffs' claims. They revealed a lack of understanding
regarding site-specific or place-based religious traditions in the following
statements:
In essence, the Inupiats claim that their religious beliefs are
inextricably inter-twined with their hunting and gathering life-
247. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
248. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
249. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979).
250. 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
251. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1165.
252. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1072-73 (citations omitted).
253. Id. at 1074-75.
254. Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 183 (D. Alaska
1982) (Inupiat Community 1).
255. See Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984)
(Inupiat Community 11).
256. Inupiat Community I, 548 F. Supp. at 188.
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style, and since all exploratory activities [in the contested area]
negatively affect some portion of their subsistence area, all such
aclivity should be interdicted on free-exercise grounds. Carried to
its ultimate, their contention would result in the creation of a vast
religious sanctuary over the Arctic seas beyond the state's
territorial waters. A claim to such a large area based on such non-
specific grounds cannot provide the sort of 'serious obstacle'
contemplated by Yoder.
The court found that the Inupiat had offered no explanation for the religious
significance of the area at issue and for how the defendants' activities would
interfere with their free exercise of religion."8 Based on the geographic
scope and religious unfamiliarity of their claim, the Native Americans were
denied access to the free exercise test.
The Inupiat, however, did submit evidence of the integration of their
religion and subsistence living. 9 In their culture, ice, sea, whale, and seal
are all part of the religion. Any interference with their natural relations,
therefore, affects the ability of the Inupiat to practice their religion. Because
the court did not understand or could not appreciate this interdependence, they
found no burden on religion.
Since they found no burden on religious practice, the court should not have
reached the second prong of the Yoder test.' To correctly apply the second
prong of Yoder, the court would have first had to find an Inupiat religious
interest in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas. Only then should they have
balanced that religious interest against the government interest in selling oil
exploration leases." ' In this confused analysis the court skipped to the
balancing test without first finding a religious burden.
These two cases show the clash between dominant and minority religions
and traditions. In the Native American and Native Alaskan communities, the
religious and cultural aspects of the individual and the community cannot be
separated. The Yoder test has not adapted well to this difference between
dominant culture religions and Native American religions. Unfortunately, even
when the Yoder test might usefully have been employed, courts have
frequently misapplied the analysis.
257. Id. at 188-89.
258. Id.
259. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motions for Judgment on the
Pleadings at 126, Inupiat Community of Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp. 182 (D.
Alaska 1982) (No. A 81-19 CIV.) (Inupiat Community 1), cited in Rosenberg, supra note 220, at
480 n.235.
260. Inupiat Community 1, 548 F. Supp. at 189.
261. Rosenberg, supra note 220, at 481.
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3. When Government Actions Do Not Infringe on Religion
Even when courts recognize that Native American interests in particular
areas are religious, they are not always willing to accept that government
action infringes upon religious practice. These cases generally turn on factual
determinations made by courts that contradict claims made by plaintiff
Indians. The Yoder balancing test is often misapplied by these courts as they
balance government interest against religious interests after determining that
the contested government actions do not infringe on religious rights. Two
cases will illustrate the improper application of the Yoder standards.
In Crow v. Gullet,' the Lakota and Tsistsistas plaintiffs sought declarato-
ry and injunctive relief against development in Bear Butte State Park in South
Dakota. This area had been used by the Lakota and Tsistsistas Indians for
vision quests, sweat lodge ceremonies, and the rite of isolation and depriva-
tion. The beauty of the Black Hills had also attracted tourists and the state
constructed a state park. The case at issue arose when the state made plans
to develop this park by adding more roads and visitor facilities. The plaintiffs
claimed that these developments and the restrictions necessary for construction
of the new facilities diminished the spiritual value of the Butte and impaired
their religious ceremonies.
The district court was not convinced by the Lakota and Tsistsistas claims
and concluded that they had "failed to establish any infringement of a
constitutionally cognizable first amendment right."' The court based its
opinion, in part, on the fact that the plaintiffs had no "property interest" in the
park.2" The court also compared the total infringement suffered in
Badoni 5 and noted that the impact suffered by the present plaintiffs was
only partial and temporary.' Finally, the district court compared the
temporary restrictions on the ability of the Lakota and Tsistsistas to practice
their religion with the "compelling state interest[] in preserving the environ-
ment and the resource from further decay and erosion, in protecting the
health, safety, and welfare of park visitors, and in improving public access to
this unique geological and historical landmark."' 7 In short, the state interest
in maintaining this park outweighed the religious rights of the Lakota and
Tsistsistas.
This extraordinary opinion was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit' as not
clearly erroneous. Although the district court found no religious burden, it
mistakenly proceeded to the second step of the Yoder analysis. Finding no
262. 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983).
263. Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785, 794 (D.C. S.D. 1982).
264. lId at 791.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 229-39.
266. Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 792.
267. Id. at 794.
268. Crow, 706 F.2d at 856.
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burden should have ended the analysis. The comparison with Badoni is
similarly misplaced because the plaintiffs in this case had not, according to
the court, met their burden of proving the "indispensability" of overnight
camping. Lastly, the lack of property interest of the plaintiffs, while
possibly a valid factor to be considered, is clearly not dispositive of whether
or not citizens can complain about governmental uses of public land that
infringe upon individual rights."
The Navajo and Hopi tribes of northeastern Arizona protested similar
development in the Coconino National Forest in Wilson v. Block."' The San
Francisco Peaks lie adjacent to the Navajo and Hopi reservations and are
believed by them to be the home of specific deities who are invoked in
Navajo religious ceremonies. The Hopis believe the Peaks to be the home of
"Kachinas" who are emissaries sent by the creator to communicate with human
beings. The tribes believe that development of the area would impair the
healing power of the Peaks and insult the Kachinas and the creator.
The Forest Service had used a portion of the Peaks for downhill skiing since
1937, though the facilities were limited. In 1977 the Forest Service transferred
the permit to operate the ski facilities to a private company who wanted to
expand the operations. The Navajo and Hopi protested this planned expansion
because it would cause the Peaks to lose their healing power and, therefore,
their religious efficacy to the tribes. They also noted that expansion of the ski
facilities would make it more difficult to teach their people that these places
were sacred. The chair of the Hopi tribe stated, "[t]he destruction of these
[religious] practices will also destroy our present way of life and culture.""
The court acknowledged that the claims of the Navajo and Hopi were
legitimately religious. It also correctly summarized the Cantwell, Sherbert, and
Thomas line of analysis. The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' application
of Sherbert and Thomas because "[tihe government here has not conditioned
any benefit upon conduct proscribed or mandated by plaintiffs' beliefs."' 3
Because the religious practices and beliefs of the Navajo and Hopi are site
specific, they argued that development would "severely impair the practice of
[their] religions if it destroyed the natural conditions necessary for the
performance of ceremonies . ... ,,74 The court backed away from the
Sequoyah centrality requirement, but said that "[i]f the plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate that the government land at issue is indispensable to some
269. ,d. at 858. Overnight camping had been restricted during the construction of the park
improvements. M/
270. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (1980).
271. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
272. d . at 740 n.2.
273. Id. at 741.
274. Md. at 742.
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religious practice, whether or not central to their religious practice, they have
not justified a First Amendment claim."'
The Navajo and Hopi produced evidence that peaks were sacred and
indispensable to their religious practice. 6 The government argued that the
limited proposed development would only impact on a portion of the character
of the Peaks and that a guarantee of access to the Peaks should permit
continuation of "all essential rituals." ' The court held that the plaintiffs had
not met their burden of demonstrating that the government's proposed land use
"would impair a religious practice that could not be performed at any other
site." ' Because the court found that the plaintiffs had not shown a burden
on their religious practice, it did not reach the question of whether the govern-
ment's interest in the proposed expansion was compelling or notY
Wilson reveals the danger of allowing courts to determine whether an
infringement on religious rights meets the Yoder "burden" standard. Wilson
was reduced to a contest of experts. The Navajo and Hopi affidavits spoke of
the tragic effects this development would have on their ability to practice their
religion. The government experts testified that the effects would not be all that
bad. The court was impressed by the government's experts and required the
plaintiffs to prove the indispensability of the particular area at issue. It ignored
the Navajo and Hopi claims that the Peaks are "sacred" and that their religious
practices required "natural conditions." 8 Indispensability, in this case,
became only a thin mask for the Sequoyah centrality requirement. The decision
was meant to take the court out of making doctrinal judgments about religious
claims, but this case shows that the judgment of what is and is not indispens-
able will still require government approval of religious claims. Even if the
"indispensable" standard is preferable to the "centrality" standard, the
opportunity for a court to apply culturally dominant perspectives to its analysis
of a minority religion is too difficult to avoid.
D. Free Exercise Conclusions
Analysis of the history and development of free exercise jurisprudence,
focusing especially on the conflicts that arise between the government and
Native Americans, reveals that the Indians almost always lose. Sometimes the
government refuses to recognize the religious character of Indian religious
claims. Other times the government recognizes that the Native American
interests are religious but does not acknowledge that the government actions
at issue actually burden religious practice. In other instances the government
275. Il at 743.
276. Id. at 744.
277. Id. (quoting a government expert on Hopi and Navajo religion).
278. Id. at 744.
279. Id. at 745.
280. Id. at 742.
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acknowledges its burden on Native Americans' religious practices but believes
that the interests of the majority culture trump the religious rights of the
Indians. In all these cases the courts have failed to protect the religious
exercise claims of Native Americans.
In Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson,"' the Ninth
Circuit held out the promise of a brighter future for Native Peoples. Unfortu-




Because the Lyng decision captures the essence of the conflict over religious
rights, the next section focuses on it exclusively.
11. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protection Ass'n and an Evolving
Understanding of Judicial Responsibility for Individual Rights
The Supreme Court continues to be engaged in an historical debate
concerning the protection of individual rights and the scope of the role of the
judiciary. Recently, the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution did not prohibit the
government from harvesting timber or constructing a road through land
considered sacred to three Northern California Indian tribes.' The differ-
ences between the majority opinion and the dissent characterize some of the
salient features of the process of questioning the role of the judiciary in
resolving these conflicts.
After presenting the facts and analysis of Lyng in detail, this section will
discuss some of the ways in which the decision exemplifies current tiends in
the Supreme Court and what those trends might mean for Native American
religious liberty.
A. Facts
The towns of Gasquet and Orleans are approximately sixty miles apart in
the northwest corner of California, twenty miles from the Pacific Ocean and
thirty miles south of the Oregon border. Between them lies the Six Rivers
National Forest. The Forest Service first planned to link these towns in the
late 1940s. A standard jeep road was constructed in the mid-1960s and was
paved in parts over the next twenty years. The primary purpose of the road
was to facilitate logging efforts in the area, though it also helped in forest fire
protection and provided increased recreational access to the area.
In 1972, the Forest Service began preparing a multiple-use management
plan for a 67,500 acre area known as the Blue Creek Unit of the Six Rivers
National Forest. The plan called for the harvesting of 733,000,000 board feet
281. 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), withdrawn and affd on reh'g, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir.
1986).
282. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
283. Peterson, 764 F.2d at 586.
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of timber over an eighty year period, the paving of the remaining six mile
segment of the road between Gasquet and Orleans (the G-O road), and the
construction of an additional two hundred miles of logging roads. The Blue
Creek Unit Plan, adopted in 1976, was the origin of the dispute which arose
between the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians and the Forest Service.
These tribes call the area known to the United States government as the
Blue Creek area, the High Country. For at least two hundred years, and
possibly longer, they have gone to the High Country for religious purposes.
Though these three communities have somewhat different religious beliefs,
they all share some common beliefs and practices. The High Country, they
believe, is where the prehuman spirits went when human beings arrived on
earth. These spirits are a source of religious power and medicine. Through
interaction with the spirits of these places, individual practitioners attain
spiritual and curative power which is shared with other members of their
community. The communities at large depend on the spirits of the High
Country to prepare their tribal leaders for ceremonies and to provide them
with healing power. These tribes also believe that their religious practices
have important "World Renewal" functions as well. The welfare of the tribe
and indeed all humanity depend on the ability of individual practitioners to
communicate with the spirits of the High Country.
Of special importance in the Blue Creek area are rock outcroppings called
Chimney Rock, Doctor Rock, and Peak 8. The importance of these peaks has
grown as others have been developed or desecrated. These sites themselves
are believed to be sacred, as they provide the environment where spiritual
rituals may take place. The qualities of "silence, the aesthetic perspective, and
the physical attributes, are an extension of the sacredness of [each] particular
site."' The pristine, undisturbed natural environment, privacy and silence
that have characterized the High Country, and especially these particular
peaks, for the preceding centuries are essential for spiritual use of the area.
The G-O Road plan called for construction within a mile of these sacred
areas.
After administrative remedies failed, the plaintiff Indianse 5 and the State
of California sought a preliminary injunction against the Forest Service to
prevent, among other things, the construction of the final six mile segment of
road, known as the Chimney Rock section. Their request for injunctive relief
was denied, 6 but a trial on the merits found that the Forest Service plan
284. DORTHEA THEODORATUS ET AL., CULTURAL RESOURCES OF THE CHIMNEY ROCK
SECTION, GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, Six RIVERS NATIONAL FOREST 101-02 (1979), reprinted in
FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
GASQUET-ORLEANS ROAD, CHIMNEY ROCK SECTION app. K, at 14 (1982), cited in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 459 (1987).
285. Including four Indian individuals, seven conservation groups, two individual
conservationists, and the Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.
286. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Cal.
No. 2]
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violated the First Amendment of the Constitution,' several federal environ-
mental acts, 5 and the fishing and water rights of the Hoopa Valley Indian
Reservation residents and the federal government's trust responsibilities to the
Hoopa Valley Indians. The district court judge permanently enjoined the
Forest Service from constructing the Chimney Rock section of the G-O Road
or engaging in timber harvesting until they produced a new environmental
impact statement.2'
While appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending, the United States Congress
passed the California Wilderness Act of 1984.' The Act protected most of
the contested area from timber harvesting but left open a corridor for the
construction of the Chimney Rock section of the G-O Road. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court in nearly all respects. 9, It did, however,
vacate the district court order as it applied to the federal government's trust
responsibility to the Indians of the Hoopa Valley Reservation, because the
trust responsibility issue could not be decided properly without the tribe being
represented.' It also withdrew that part of the order relating to the violation
of the federal Wilderness Act that had been made moot by the passage of the
California Wilderness Act. The other parts of the district court order,
including the constitutional issue, were affirmed.
The Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision,29 reversed the Ninth Circuit.'
Justice O'Connor wrote for the majority 5 and held that the First Amend-
ment did not prohibit the government from permitting timber harvesting and
road construction in the Blue Creek/High Country area.2' The majority
viewed this question to be controlled by the Court's analysis in Bowen v.
Roy where the Court rejected an Indian's constitutional challenge to the
1982).
287. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. . .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I.
288. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(b) (1988)); Wilderness Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988); Federal
Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 880 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988)).
289. Northwest Indian Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 606 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
290. Pub. L. 98-425,98 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1132 (1988)).
291. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir.
1985), withdrawn and affid on reh'g, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub non. Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1987).
292. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 697 n.10.
293. Newly appointed Justice Anthony Kennedy did not participate in this decision.
294. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
295. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, John Paul
Stevens, and Byron White.
296. Lyng, at 440.
297. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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assignment of a social security number to his daughter." He believed that
the use of a social security number by government agencies would "rob the
spirit" of his daughter and prevent her from becoming a holy person.' The
Lyng Court stated that the use of a social security number could not be distin-
guished from the building of a road or the harvesting of timber on govern-
ment land.' For the majority, the key point was that these actions did not
coerce an individual to act in opposition to his or her religious beliefs or
penalize him or her by prohibiting the receipt of some governmental benefit.
They reasoned that any other decision in this context would amount to
"beneficial ownership of . . .public property" and "diminution of the
Government['s] property rights."
3 '
The dissenten described the majority reading of the Free Exercise Clause
as narrow, emphasizing the form rather than the effect of government
action.' Where the majority required that the plaintiffs show affirmative
coercion, Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, called for a test that focuses on
government action that poses a real and substantial threat of frustrating
religious practices.'n The Brennan test would require that claimants would
have to show a sincere belief and a substantial threat to religious practice.
Upon such a showing the government would have to justify the infringement
upon religious exercise with a compelling state interest.
B. Sacred Places and Free Exercise of Religion
As a result of the Lyng decision, the sole inquiry in a free exercise conflict
is whether a government action coerces an individual into violating his or her
religious beliefs. An infringement can be either indirect coercion or a penalty,
but the effect of a government action upon the ability of a particular group to
practice its religion is not relevant to the determination of constitutionality. 5
The dissent protests that "[b]oth common sense and our prior cases teach us
... that governmental action that makes the practice of a given faith more
difficult necessarily penalizes that practice and thereby tends to prevent
adherence to religious belief."' Justice Brennan explained, "The incongru-
ous result is that when the government forces an individual or group to chose
between their beliefs and a benefit, it is an impermissible burden, yet when
the government prevents a practice and entirely eliminates the element of
choice, no burden exists."'
298. lId at 710-12.
299. Id. at 696.
300. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
301. Id. at 453.
302. Justices William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and Blackmun.
303. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 466-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
304. Id. at 459.
305. Id. at 451.
306. L at 456.
307. Nancy Akins, New Direction in Sacred Lands Claims: Lyng v. Northwest Indian
No. 2]
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C. The Role of the Judiciary
1. The Judiciary and Native Americans
The previous sections have developed the history and analysis of the Lyng
case in some detail because these issues point to what is the primary
precipitate of the Lyng decision. Lyng is rightly seen as a case about the Free
Exercise Clause and Native American claims to sacred lands. Underlying the
analysis in Lyng, however, is the central issue of the role of the judiciary in
protecting individual rights and its interaction with the other branches of
government.
Justice O'Connor raises this issue in her response to Justice Brennan's
dissent when she asserts that his proposal "would cast the Judiciary in a role
that [it] was never intended to play.""3 8 Her opinion reflects her own
significant deference to other branches of government on constitutional issues,
one that seems to be gaining greater acceptance by other members of the
Court." Justice Brennan described this abdication to the legislature as
bestowing "on one party ...the unilateral authority to resolve all future
disputes in its favor, subject only to the Court's toothless exhortation to be
.sensitive' to affected religions.""3 '
Justice O'Connor sees the claimants as asking the Court "to satisfy every
citizen's religious needs and desires." '' In a pluralistic society with many
religious beliefs, she anticipates competing demands on government to
conform to the mandates of each religious group. Since neither the Constitu-
tion nor the courts are equipped to reconcile these competing demands, that
task is left to the legislature. To support her claim, she cites The Federalist
No. 10, which suggests that competition among religious and political factions
will temper these demands." 2
This decision has profound implications for all litigation of constitutional
claims. Her statement puts the religious interests of minorities in the hands
of the majoritarian dominated branches of government to protect them from
infringement on fundamental rights by those same branches. Roy,3 3 upon
which the majority decision heavily relieg, centers upon the fact that the
claimant was asking the government to change one of its internal procedures
to avoid offending his religious beliefs. That case focused on how the
Cemetery Protective Association, 29 NAT. REsOURCES J. 593, 605 (1989).
308. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 458.
309. Donald Falk, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association: Bulldozing
First Amendment Protection of Indian Sacred Lands, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 561 (1989).
310. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 473.
311. d. at 453.
312. IM. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 58-59 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961)).
313. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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government conducted its own affairs. The issue in the Lyng case centers
upon what effect the government is having on the ability of the claimants to
practice their religion. By characterizing all government agency action as
same as Roy internal procedures, the Court confers absolute discretion on
executive and congressional agencies with respect to the effect of their actions
on fundamental rights.
For Native Americans, this decision means that there is no constitutional
review of government actions that fail to prohibit outright rituals or require
violation of beliefs. Actions which make it impossible or meaningless for
Indians to practice their faith cannot be reviewed. The severity of this ruling
is exacerbated by the fact that Indians are dependent upon so many federal
agencies and subject to the actions of so many public land managers.3 4 The
Court encourages land managers to accommodate religious practices of Native
Americans,"' but also assures the agencies that their determination of what
is an acceptable level of deleterious effect will receive unfavorable review.
When one branch of government abdicates its responsibility, the three-
footed stool of American democracy cannot stand. A government which does
not check cannot balance. James Madison warned against the gradual
accumulation of power in one of the departments of government. Madison
saw that the legislative branch was most prone to power grabbing in a
republican government. A government which allows the power of majority
factions to dominate minority groups is, in his mind, no different from the
pre-social contract community. He said:
Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It
ever has been, and ever will be pursued, until it be obtained, or
until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society, under the forms
of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the
weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of
nature where the weaker individual is not secured against the
violence of the stronger.316
The Lyng decision returns Native Americans to the state of nature in regards
to religious liberty. Unless some bulwark can be established against the
strength of the majority, their religious freedom will not be secure against the
violence of intolerance.
2. Constitutional Rights and the Judiciary
That Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan, along with their fellow justices,
should disagree about what is the proper role of the judiciary in resolving an
issue of this complexity is not surprising. These questions require herculean
314. Falk, supra note 309, at 564.
315. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
316. THE FFDERAUsT No. 51, at 352 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
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effort to dissect and have been the source of immense conflict throughout the
history of the modem liberal state. Since Jean Jacques Rousseau and the Baron
de Montesquieu derived different understandings of the nature of the state and
the relationship of the judiciary to the other constituent parts of the state, there
has been widespread disagreement on these points.
The interesting aspect of this problem in Lyng is more how the Court
arrived at its decision than what its decision held. The two opinions in the case
reach substantially different results through generally different approaches, even
though they do manifest some similarity. Loosely, Justice O'Connor appears
to favor a restrained judiciary that defers substantially to legislative determina-
tions in all areas save for those directly relegated to the care of the Court.
Justice Brennan, on the other hand, calls the Court to be more active in
protecting individual liberty against the excesses of the representative branches.
In this sense, both Justices agree with Montesquieu that the different branches
need to be separated from one another and with the Federalists that they should
also serve as some form of check on the power of the other. Justice O'Connor
seems to share Rousseau's optimism that the general will of the people will
produce a legal culture that will respect minority rights, while Justice Brennan
appears more skeptical.
Justice O'Connor relies on a variety of methods of legal reasoning to justify
her decision: appeal to fundamental principles, reference to general policy
goals, and reliance upon established precedent. These three approaches are
interwoven throughout her discussion of the impact of the Free Exercise Clause
of the Constitution on this case. She relies on the interpretation of the scope
of the Free Exercise Clause discussed in Bowen v. Roy to limit the breadth of
the Court's discussion."7 She points to the potential conflict between a wide
range of government policies and the fundamental rights asserted by the Lyng
plaintiffi;.3"' She discusses the central principles which give order to the
relationship among the governmental branches."9
D. Lyng and What It Portends
Lyng is a tragic defeat for the Native American population in this country,
who saw it as an opportunity for vindication and protection of what they
understood to be their rights as United States citizens. Their disappointment is
also a loss for other minority groups, who might otherwise have sought the
protection of the judicial system from over-zealous legislatures. The Court has
restricted its own ability to protect individual rights by limiting the questions
it will consider. Part of this decision is an only slightly subtle intertextual
discussion of which body among the governmental entities is best equipped to
respond to this claim. The Lyng Court has held that unless there is a clear and
317. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457-58.
318. Id. at 452.
319. Id. at 457-58.
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unambiguous violation of the plain meaning of the Free Exercise Clause, it
will not interfere in legislative or administrative decisions. This decision
reflects a heavy deference to majoritarian decision making, with all its
attendant difficulties.
IV. Native American Spirituality
At the center of all the controversy expressed in the cases discussed in
this article Indian peoples are struggling desperately to maintain their
spiritual beliefs, their culture, their ethnic identity, and their way of life.
Two problems appear between the majority Indian communities. The first
difficulty Native American communities have faced in presenting their legal
challenges to the actions of the invading peoples is that they, like most
insular minorities, tend to be viewed as one and similar. Because they are
different from Europeans, all Indians are seen as a mass or a unit. Most
people fail to see that individual tribal groups and indeed individual Indians
have different experiences of spirituality and different belief systems. Native
Americans are quick to point out that their traditions are as complex and
varied as the multiplicity of their cultures would suggest. The first problem
Native Peoples face is that judges fail to accept that Native American belief
and practice is itself pluralistic and varied.
The second problem Native Americans face when they present constitu-
tional challenges to government action is that they are asking judges to
protect religious beliefs and traditions fundamentally different from their
own. If courts are to make insightful decisions about Native American
religious exercise disputes, they must have some understanding of the nature
of Indian life and of its differences from that of the dominant culture.
This section attempts to illuminate some of those differences, to describe
some of the general characteristics of Native American spirituality, and in
particular to draw out the significance of sacred places. Of necessity, this
discussion will simplify a complex subject. Not all Native American groups
would ascribe to all of the beliefs portrayed here, but this level of generaliza-
tion will usefully capture some of the most salient points of interest. Other
scholars have written on this subject with particular virtuosity and should be
consulted for a more detailed description of the spirituality of America's
original peoples.32
320. See, e.g., DELORIA, supra note 3; SEEING WrTH A NATIVE EYE (Walter H. Capps ed.,
1976); JOHN (FIRE) LAME DEER & RICHARD ERDoEs, LAME DEER: SEEKER OF VISIONS (1972);
JOHN G. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS (1932); AKE HULTKRANiz, THE RELIGIONS OF THE
AMERICAN INDIANS (1967); RUPERT Ross, DANCING wrrH A GHOST (1992).
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A. Differences Between Europeans and Americans
Before courts can protect Indian sacred sites and practices, they must first
appreciate the spiritual character of their claims. The many differences
between the spiritual life of Native Americans and the descendants of
immigrants challenges understanding and toleration. These differences arise
from several factors.
As discussed earlier,32' the general assumption by Europeans when they
encountered Native Peoples was that the natives knew no religipn. Out of
ignorance and intolerance of theologies different from their own, the
Europeans called the indigenous peoples pagans, savages, brutes, and
heathens. The process of cultural destruction began with the first Columbian
contacts.
[E]ach time the Spanish encountered a native individual or group
in the course of their travels they were ordered to read to the
Indians a statement informing them of the truth of Christianity
and the necessity to swear immediate allegiance to the Pope and
the Spanish crown. . . . As one Spanish conquistador and
historian described the routine: 'After they had been put in
chains, someone read the Requerimento without knowing their
language and without any interpreters, and without either the
reader or the Indians understanding the language they had not
opportunity to reply, being in immediately carried away prison-
ers, the Spanish not failing to use the stick on those who did not
go fast enough.'3 "
As it was at that time, language is currently one of the primary obstacles.
Because he dominant society has not accepted native spirituality on its own
terms, all Indian traditions and beliefs must be translated, in order for their
petition to be heard in the American judicial system.3"
This necessity might seem only practically expedient, but it has significant
consequences. The result.is that the plaintiff Indians in Smith had to describe
their use of peyote as "sacrament," even though that word has no currency
in Indian spirituality. Indians describe their sacred places as churches or
altars in order to help non-Indians understand their significance. They have
analogized moose meat used in a funeral ceremony to the "wine and wafer
of Christianity.""3 All these phenomena are understood, if at all, only in
translation, not in their original terms. Indeed, Native American traditional
languages do not even have a word to express the European notion of
321. See supra text accompanying notes 14-38.
322. STANNARD, supra note 2, at 65-66.
323. See Christopher T. Vecsey, Prologue, in HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 12.
324. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1072, 1072 (Alaska 1979).
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"religion."3 These differences frustrate any discussion of spiritual practic-
es.
Other factors are equally significant. Native American spiritual practices
manifest great diversity from group to group. They also tolerate substantially
more internal diversity than does the Judeo-Christian tradition. Within Native
American life there are no accepted canonical texts, no sense of orthodoxy.
The Lyng court saw in this lack of uniformity a source of doubt as to the
validity of the claims of the plaintiffs."2 In reality, however, Indian tradi-
tions simply allow a greater sense of pluralism than do others. Unfortunately,
this diversity has not been accepted by non-Indians as an essential aspect of
tribal beliefs."
Native American spiritual traditions tend to be more spatially oriented and
less time-oriented. Western European religions are based on a different
relationship to space and an "assumption that time proceeds in a linear
fashion."'3 The result for Judeo-Christian religions is that "[r]evelation has
generally been considered as a specific body of truth related to a particular
individual at a specific time."3 For Native Americans, "[r]evelation [is]
a particular experience at a particular place, [with] no universal truth
emerging .... ""0 Some Judeo-Christian religions, unlike Indian religions,
are arranged hierarchically.3 ' There is a clear line of authority; some
people decide what other people should believe. Though Native American
communities also have shamans, priests, and medicine men and women, their
relationship to the people is much different. They are viewed not as teachers
or missionaries, but as people who have some special "proximity and access
to the sacred beings and forces."332
Finally, Native American spiritual practices are mystifying because they
are generally conducted in secret and in remote places. Most non-Indians
have never witnessed an authentic Indian spiritual ceremony. Because they
have been remembered through the oral history of discrete communities,
there has been little opportunity even for those with interest in Native
American spirituality to understand and appreciate them.
325. HULTKRAN1Z, supra note 320, at 9.
326. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
327. Vecsey, supra note 323, at 12.
328. DELORIA, supra note 3, at 76.
329. Id. at 80.
330. Id.
331. JERRY MANDER, THE ABsENCE OF THE SACRED: THE FAILURE OF TECHNOLOGY AND
THE SURVIVAL OF THE INDIAN NATIONs 209 (1991).
332. Deward E. Walker, Jr., Protection of American Indian Sacred Geography, in
HANDBOOK, supra note 84, at 105.
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B. Characteristics of Native American Spiritual Traditions
Being rooted in and connected to the natural world are two fundamental
characteristics of Indian spirituality. Indian religions are "religions of nature."
Through the myths, legends, stories, and rituals that carry the religious beliefs
through history, Indians learn that they are part of the environment around
them. "Mysterious but real power dwells in nature - in mountains, rivers,
rocks, even pebbles. White people may consider them inanimate objects, but
to the Indian, they are enmeshed in the web of the universe, pulsating with
life and potent with medicine." '333 Indians also acknowledge their dependence
upon the earth.
We all start out in this world as tiny seeds - no different from
our animal brothers and sisters, the deer, the bear, the buffalo, or
the trees, the flowers, the winged people. Every particle of our
bodies come from the good things Mother Earth has put forth.
Mother Earth is our real mother, because every bit of us truly
comes from her, and daily she takes care of us. 3
They hunted and farmed, took life and sustained it, but they attributed their
success to the generosity of nature.3 Out of this reverence for nature grows
the sense that places can be sacred.
Native American spiritual beliefs are also based on a related spirit of
"connectedness." All of Indian life is interrelated and dependent. All aspects
of reality, earth, animals, spirits, stars, humans, and plants, are one. The past
is contained in the present. The earth which gives life to people today is the
body of people who have died. A Crow chief said: "The soil you see is not
ordinary soil - it is the dust of the blood, the flesh and the bones of our
ancestors. ... You will have to dig down through the surface before you can
find nature's earth, as the upper portion is Crow."3 In the Indian world it
is impossible to "separate religious reality from other aspects of communal
experience."" The spiritual aspect of life is intimately tied to the political,
the economic, and the social.38 Every human action, hunting, weaving,
prayer, and dance is "a recognition and affirmation of the sacredness of
life."
339
333. PiCHARD ERDOES & ALPHONSO ORTIZ, AMERICAN INDIAN MYTHS AND LEGENDS at
xi (1984).
334. ED MCGAA, EAGLE MAN, MOTHER EARTH SPIRITUALITY: NATIVE AMERICAN PATHS
TO HEALING OURSELVES AND OUR WORLD 203 (1990).
335. Christopher T. Vecsey, American Indian Environmental Religions, in CHRISTOPHER T.
VECSEY Er AL., AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTALISTS: ECOLOGICAL ISSUES IN NATIVE
AMERICAN HISTORY 15 (1980).
336. DI:LORIA, supra note 3, at 166.
337. Id at 82; see also Barre Toelken, Seeing with a Native Eye: How Many Sheep Will it
Hold?, in SEEING WITH A NATIVE EYE, supra note 320, at 14.
338. MANDER, supra note 331, at 208.
339. Annie L. Booth & Harvey L. Jacobs, Ties that Bind: Native American Beliefs as a
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Native American spirituality is also communal. Christianity, on the other
hand, is premised upon an individual response to revelation.' Indian tribal
culture is dominated by religion. "Ceremonies of community wide [sic] scope
are the chief characteristic feature of religious activity."'" The interdepen-
dence of subsistence living requires that every aspect of the community be
integrated. There is, of course, a deep individual dimension to Indian
spirituality, but the religions remain inherently communal." The communal
character of belief and practice informs the connection to the natural world
and the connectedness of reality. It allows the Navajo in Wilson v. Bloc -43
to believe that the San Francisco Peaks are a living deity and that they are
essential to the survival of the Navajo people.
Deward E. Walker, Jr. has summarized the "core features" of traditional
Native American spirituality as follows:
1. A body of mythic accounts explaining cultural origins
and cultural development as distinctive peoples.
2. A special sense of the sacred that is centered in natural
time and natural geography.
3. A set of critical and calendrical rituals that give social
form and expression to religious beliefs and permit the
groups and their members to experience their mythology.
4. A group of individuals normally described as shamans
(medicine men and medicine women) who teach and lead
group(s) in the conduct of their ritual life.
5. A set of prescriptive and proscriptive (ethical) guidelines
establishing appropriate behavior associated with the
sacred.
6. A means of communicating (dreams and visions) with
sacred spirits and forces.
7. A belief in dreams and visions as the principal sources of
religious knowledge.
8. A belief that harmony must be maintained with the
sacred through the satisfactory conduct of rituals and
adherence to sacred prescriptions and proscriptions.
9. A belief that while all aspects of nature and culture are
potentially sacred, there are certain times and geological
locations that together possess great sacredness.
10. The major goal of religious life is gaining the spiritual
power and understanding necessary for a successful life,
Foundation for Environmental Consciousness, 12 ENVTL. EThicS 40 (1990).
340. DELoRIA, supra note 3, at 63, 198.
341. Id. at 200.
342. Id. at 200-08.
343. See supra note 227.
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by entering into the sacred at certain sacred times/
places.' "
These norms would not be likely to achieve universal approval, but they are
generally descriptive of the common attributes of Native American spirituality.
C. Sacred Places
The sacredness of place captures all of these characteristics of Native
American life. When Indians claim that particular sites are sacred they say,
[O]ur ancestors arose from the earth here; our parents are buried
here, we receive revelation here; ... we make pilgrimages and
vision quests here; our gods dwell here; our religion requires that
we have privacy here; . . . [and] hence, this sacred site must
remain undisturbed, or we must have unlimited access to this
place.'
They say that when they speak of land, they "are speaking of something
sacred,"' and they say that some areas are more sacred than others.3"
To Native Americans the sanctity of land and places is the reference point
for their understanding of the world.' The Indians chose to live close to
their sacred places: there the power and mystery of life are concentrated. The
sacred sites are sources of insight and meaning. They are regarded as
"essential for human survival." "
D. Conclusions
The history of Indian interaction with whites has been a struggle for land.
European immigrants wanted land to occupy and develop, to exploit and
civilize. For the Indians, this struggle has been not only a territorial issue, but
also a spiritual issue, and a question of cultural survival. This section has
shown that the Indian relationship with the land is intimately spiritual.
Because relationship with the earth pervades the entire Indian existence, any
damage to the land affects the entire people. The contests portrayed in the
cases discussed herein are, as a result, not simple battles over resources, not
merely logging interests against wilderness preservation. At their core, they
are about the survival of the Indian nations, the identity of the plaintiffs as
Indians, and the well being of all people.
344. Walker, supra note 332, at 102.
345. Vecsey, supra note 323, at 22.
346. I ER MAThIESSON, INDIAN COUNTRY 119 (1984).
347. Dewald Walker identifies 30 sacred sites that are currently in use, out of an
accumulating list of approximately 300. Walker, supra note 332, at 108-09.
348. DELORIA, supra note 3, at 75.
349. Walker, supra note 332, at 25.
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V. What Can We Do?
The unwillingness of the Supreme Court to entertain Indian free exercise
challenges to government actions when Indians ask the Court to protect sacred
sites creates a completely novel situation in the history of fundamental rights
in this country. Native Americans have been told by the court in Lyng3  and
Smith 5 ' that they should look to legislative solutions for their problems with
the federal government's use of its own land." The Bill of Rights was
drafted to protect fundamental individual rights from the whims of
majoritarian politics, but the Supreme Court has told Indians that it will not
protect those rights against actions by the other branches of government.
Justice O'Connor, the author of the Lyng opinion, in her earlier concurrence
in Smith quoted Justice Jackson's memorable words:
The very purpose of [the] Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom
of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not
be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elec-
tions.3
Native Americans are forced to ask the very people they believe to be
infringing on their rights to protect them. In this situation there is little cause
for hope.
Any solution must advocate some substantial changes in approach. Two
possible solutions are (1) reformation of the free exercise jurisprudence of free
exercise, and (2) legislative action.
A. Jurisprudential Reform
The Lyng and Smith Courts read the Free Exercise Clause protections very
narrowly." As a result, Indian claims have not even been successful when
350. The Lyng Court stated:
The Constitutin does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various
competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere religious
belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours. That task, to the extent
that it is feasible, is for the legislatures and other institutions.
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
351. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
352. Id. at 890.
353. Id. at 903 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
354. "[D]ecisions of the United States Supreme Court... have narrowed the scope of Native
American religious free exercise rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States .... . S. 1979, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. pmbl. (1989)
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the Court has accepted that the proposed government action would "virtually
destroy"355 the ability of the Indians to practice their religion. Because the
action at issue was seen to have only an "incidental" effect and did not
directly coerce individuals to act contrary to their beliefs, the Lyng Court held
that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated.
A different standard for infringement would be required in order to protect
the rights of Native Americans. Dewald Walker has argued that the
"centrality" standard, which requires that a sacred site be deemed essential,
indispensable, or required for the practice of a religion, be replaced with an
"integrity" standard. 6 An integrity standard would view an infringement on
religious exercise as a forced or undesired change in the customary practice
of a religion. This standard would find an infringement if the physical
conditions required for a customary ritual had been so altered that perfor-
mance was prevented." This standard would clearly benefit Native Ameri-
cans, but the case law has demonstrated that even when the plaintiffs can
prove an infringement on religious rights, courts easily outweigh religious
interests with almost any government interest.35
Perhaps a better response to the judicial practice of "passing the buck" is
to abolish the incidental/direct harm dichotomy. After Smith, the government
is free to harm religious practice if it does so indirectly. Only overt intention
to harm religious practice is prohibited. A framework whereby a violation of
the First Amendment would be found whenever a governmental action
adversely affected the ability of an individual to practice his or her religion
could be usefully and constitutionally applied. The plaintiff would still
initially be required to demonstrate the religious character of her belief and
that it was sincerely held. If that burden is met, whether the governmental
action directly targets religious believers or whether it only incidentally affects
the ability of believers to practice their beliefs, the government would then
have to demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the interference with free
exercise rights. Many new claims would be open to free exercise balancing
as a result. Courts would be required to undergo the same factual assessment
that they already perform in the free speech context. This suggestion is,
however, susceptible to the same criticism as is Walker's, but it avoids
potential problems with the ability of the judiciary to evaluate both when the
integrity of a religious practice is disturbed and Establishment Clause conflicts
that might result.
(introduced by Sen. Inouye).
355. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
356. Walker, supra note 332, at 112.
357. 1 at 113.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 229-61.
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Because neither of these suggestions are likely to be heeded by the present
Supreme Court, Native Americans might do better to accept Justice
O'Connor's suggestion to look to the legislature for assistance.
B. Legislative Possibilities
Shortly after the Lyng decision was rendered, Rep. Morris Udall (D.-Ariz.)
introduced a bill calling for amendments to the AIRFA,3 9 to prohibit federal
agencies from managing government land in a manner that poses a "substan-
tial and realistic threat to undermine and frustrate traditional Native American
practices."'  Representative Udall had been widely quoted by courts for
referring to AIRFA as a bill that conferred no "special religious rights on
Indians" and which in fact had "no teeth in it." 1 Courts have accepted this
reading of the Act, even though other less restrictive readings are possible.
AIRFA was the first legislative attempt to protect and preserve the rights
of American Indians to believe, express, and practice their traditional
religions. The Act was meant to accomplish the protections that the First
Amendment bad not been able to achieve2' Although AIRFA established
a governmental policy of protecting Native American religious practice, it did
nothing to affect the practice of federal land management. In the years since
the passage of AIRFA, the ability of Indians to practice their religion on
government lands has been limited.
Since that time, various other amendments to the AIRFA have been
proposed. Representative Udall, Sen. John McCain (R.-Ariz.), and Sen. Daniel
Inouye (D.-Haw.) have all introduced bills to amend the AIRFA. Senator
Inouye's bill' was reintroduced on January 14th, 1991 and showed the most
promise of early passage. This bill directed the Executive branch to develop
rules and regulations which will guarantee Native American free exercise of
religion.' It encouraged cooperation between Federal agencies on accom-
modating both Native American religious needs and the other management
goals for federal land.3 It also established administrative procedures for
Indians to complain when federal activities "disturb the integrity of Native
American religious places, sacred places, or the sanctity thereof, or interfere
with the access thereto, or use thereof, or adversely affect the exercise of the
Native American religions, as determined by the affected Native American
359. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988)).
360. H.R. 1546, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(a) (1989).
361. 124 CONG. REc. 21,444-45 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall); see also Lyng, 485 U.S.
at 455.
362. See O'Brien, Tribes & Indians, supra note 116, at 1471.
363. See supra note 359.
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practitioners."3 The bill aimed to involve Native American input into
federal land management decisions and to give them recourse when their
rights are not adequately protected.
Concerns were raised at the time that this bill was languishing in Congress
that it could implicate Establishment Clause conflicts. Professor Laurence
Tribe proposed several revisions of the amendment to avoid the Establishment
Clause problems raised by the involvement and authority of Native American
religious leaders in determining when a government activity infringes on
religious liberty.' Professor David Williams also evaluated the appearance
of an Establishment Clause violation and determined that the amendments fell
into a category of accommodation of religion that is neither proscribed nor
prescribed." In any event, the Inouye amendments to AIRFA were never
passed.
Other legislative possibilities have been discussed. Jack Trope has
suggested. that Native Americans could consider using the National Historic
Preservation Act 7 to register sacred sites as "landmarks" to protect them
from other government actions.3 ' Religious sites are not generally included
within the designation of landmark, but Indian religious places may qualify
because Indians do not segregate religion from the other aspects of their
culture. This suggestion would require that Native Americans identify
particular sacred areas, something tribal groups such as the Hopi would surely
resist. They have continuously asserted that the location of their sacred places
are secret. If protection cannot be found elsewhere, there may be no other
legislative alternative.
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969" is also a
possible avenue for protection of Native American religious sites. NEPA
requires an environmental impact statement for any government action which
significantly affects the "quality of the human environment."" Effects on
historical or cultural sites are included within the parameters of the environ-
mental impact statement, and actions adversely affecting landmarks on the
367. Id § 6(a) (emphasis added).
368. Laurence H. Tribe, Comments on Proposed Legislation to Protect Native American
Religious Freedom, Memorandum to 1990 Meeting of Native American Tribal Leaders and
Academics (on file with author).
369. David C. Williams, Constitutionality of Proposed Amendments to the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act, Written Testimony Before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 369 (commenting on the first Inouye bill, S. 1979, 101th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987), which was resubmitted as S. 110).
370. Prb. L. No. 89-664, 80 Stat. 915 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1988)).
371. Jack F. Trope, Alternative Approaches to the Protection of Sacred Sites, Association
of American Indian Affairs Memo (Jan. 16, 1991) (on file with author).
372. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(b) (1988).
373. Id. § 4332.
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National Register must also be noted.374 Native Americans should consider
using these two acts in combination, if other options are not available."'
Two bills were introduced in the 103d Congress in 1993 that have the
potential of providing the protection which the Supreme Court has failed to
provide and which has not yet been forthcoming legislatively. The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act376 was introduced in the House of Representatives
by Rep. Charles E. Schumer (D.-N.Y.) and in the Senate by Sen. Edward M.
Kennedy (D.-Mass). The purpose of the bill is "to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner... and Wisconsin v. Yoder... and
to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
burdened."3 The bill also aims "to provide a claim or defense to persons
whose religious exercise is burdened by government."3" This bill legislative-
ly "overturns" the Smith decision by requiring the government to justify
burdens on religious exercise even if those burdens are imposed by laws
which are facially neutral toward religion. Initially, several groups opposed
the bill, fearing that the bill might impact upon the right of religious organiza-
tions to receive public funds for social service programs and might create a
"religious" right to abortion. After those issues were resolved and the most
significant opposition to the bill agreed to support it, the bill passed the
Congress and was signed by President Clinton on November 16, 1993.
Unfortunately, it alone will not adequately protect free exercise rights peculiar
to Native Americans.
The Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act of 19933" was
introduced in the Senate by Senator Inouye. This bill acknowledges the
"chilling and discriminatory effect on the free exercise of Native American
religions"3" of the Lyng decision. In response, it creates specific protection
for Native American sacred sites, the traditional use of peyote, Native
American prisoners' rights to practice their religion while incarcerated, and the
religious use of eagles and other animals and plants. A very important
component of this bill is a section which gives any federal court jurisdiction
over Native American claims that a governmental action would restrict the
petitioner's free exercise of religion. If the petitioner can show "any evidence
that a restriction upon the practitioner's free exercise of religion exists as a
result of federal or state action,""' then "the governmental authority shall
refrain from such action unless it can demonstrate that application of the
restriction to the practitioner is essential to further a compelling governmental
374. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, 1508.27(8) (1991).
375. Trope, supra note 368.
376. H.R. 1308, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 578, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
377. H.R. 1308, § 2(b)(1); S. 578, § 2(b)(1).
378. H.R. 1308, § 2(b)(2); S. 578 § 2(b)(2).
379. S. 1021, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
380. d § 101(9).
381. a d § 501(2).
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interest and the application is the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest."3"
The provisions of this bill cure some of the Establishment Clause issues
raised about the amendments to AIRFA. The previous legislation, which
allowed the Native American petitioners to define a violation, even if they did
not violate the Establishment Clause, left too much ambiguity to be practically
workable. The new bill provides more clarity.
Together these bills would undo much of the damage done to the free
exercise tights of the first Americans. Legislative remedies, though not
satisfying, are necessary responses to the failure of the judicial system to
protect Native American religious rights. Legislative whims change with the
political wind. Protections afforded today can be eroded by future representa-
tives. While the current jurisprudence refuses to acknowledge the religious
integrity and cultural necessity of the spiritual practices of Native Peoples,
legislation is probably the best protection available. Protection today, although
ephemeral, is better than no protection at all.
The Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1993 and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act appear to afford the most substantial
guarantees for Native American religious practice. Other possibilities do exist,
though they would not provide the full range of protection afforded under
these acts. Congress should provide a clear mandate to restore the "full scope
of rights and remedies ... available under the free exercise of the Constitu-
tion of the United States . . . ."" Nothing less befits the tradition of
religious toleration with which this country began and nothing less befits the
special responsibility owed to the first Americans.
Conclusion
The United States has had a troubled relationship with the first Americans.
Alexis de Tocqueville described the European majority in the young country
he observed as "omnipotent."' ' Native Americans experienced that power
as they struggled to maintain their homelands and even their identity
throughout hundreds of years of abuse. The United States policy has shifted
from respect for the autonomy of aboriginal peoples to attempting to
assimilate them into the dominant culture. Presently, Native Americans stand
on the threshold of a new era that might return them to the status of the self-
governing communities they enjoyed before the arrival of white people.
Indigenous people all over the globe have begun to organize themselves
politically, to be recognized by the established governmental powers, and to
382. Id. § 501(1).
383. S. 110 atpmbl.
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gain support for their demands of autonomy and protection. They raise the
international agreements which pertain to them in their domestic court battles
and press for new developments on the international front. The years to come
hold the possibility of developing the respect for their rich cultural heri-
tage.M
Indigenous people are one of the least protected minorities in the world
today. They struggle against political regimes that still for the most part do
not allow them to live their traditional lifestyle and do not provide the
protection that their cultures need and deserve. National governments do not
give Native Peoples equal opportunities to choose the benefits of development
and at the same time they do not permit them to remain the same. One of the
most common conflicts is over the rights of indigenous peoples to practice
their traditional spiritual beliefs. The native North Americans have found their
ability to exercise their beliefs limited in many ways.
This article has reviewed the history of the battle for religious rights that
Native Americans continue to wage to this day. Indian sacred places are still
not protected from the economic development interests of federal land
managers who do not value Native American culture. The judiciary has
washed its hands of this question. Without significant jurisprudential reform,
courts will not provide the fundamental Constitutional rights to Indians that
they do to other United States citizens. The Supreme Court has pointed
Native Americans to the door of the legislature as a possible source for
religious protection. Though we all should be concerned about the Court's
willingness to abdicate their mandate as champion of individual rights and
fundamental freedoms, there are possibilities for Native Americans within the
political sphere. The AIRFA should be given the "teeth" it never received in
the form of the Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act should be passed to put the Native Peoples
on the same footing, with the same standards of protection, as all other
religious groups. Other current legislation should be examined for its potential
to defend Indian sacred places. Protection of the ability of Native Americans
to practice their beliefs is not only a matter of principle. It is a matter of
cultural survival. Their struggle should be the concern of every citizen of this
country, for until the first Americans are equal Americans, the wounds of
years past will continue to stain all of our hands with guilt.
385. See the appendix to this article.
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APPENDIX
Indigenous People in International Perspective
The history of the indigenous Americans is but one story among many
similar stories throughout the history of the world. Indigenous people have
generally lost in their relations with European powers. They have lost their
lives, their territory, their culture, their autonomy, and their spirituality. The
Native Americans are one example of the system of exploitation that has
become common worldwide. Still, the system in the United States is seen
internationally as a success. The treatment of Indians in this country, while
at times genocidal and inhumane, has become the measure against which other
systems are assessed. Though it may challenge credulity, Native Peoples in
the United States, in general, have been better treated than those in other
countries.
To this day, no universally accepted international standards exist to guide
relations with indigenous people. The current international system remains
predominantly state centered; states are therefore reluctant to support
indigenous rights claims which might conflict with their assertions of
sovereignty.3 To establish an international legal system that guarantees
indigenous rights will take great effort. First, the content of those rights must
be established and agreed upon. Second, indigenous people must gain the
support of those rights by stdtes, despite state fears of diminution in
sovereignty." A brief discussion of the relationship between the modern
organized international community and Native Peoples will demonstrate the
difficulty of this task.
Hundreds of years of history are relevant to this discussion, but for
purposes of this short history, the period after the formation of the United
Nations in 1948 will only be discussed. In 1949, Bolivia proposed setting up
a United Nations subcommission to study the "situation of the aboriginal
population of the American continent."3" A number of American countries
did not support this idea, and no other similar proposals were made for two
decades. 9
During the period of the late sixties and seventies, the special problems of
indigenous peoples began attracting more and more international attention. In
1970, the U.N. recommended that a detailed study of discrimination against
386. Anaya, supra note 15.
387. Id. at 215.
388. Jost R. MARTINEZ COBO, UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL,
COMMISSICN ON HUMAN RIGHTS, SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND
PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INDIGENOUS
POPULATIONS, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7 & Adds.1-4 (1987).
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indigenous peoples be prepared. Nongovernmental organizations began to get
involved in the problem and a number of major conferences were called to
discuss indigenous issues. The first international conference of nongovern-
mental organizations on indigenous issues was held in 1977. In 1981, the
U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities appointed a Special Rapporteur to study discrimination against
indigenous people.3"
All this attention resulted in the establishment, in 1981, of a Working
Group on Indigenous Populations of the U.N. Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. Since its founding
the Working Group has been seen as innovative on a number of levels. It
allowed oral and written contributions by all indigenous peoples organizations
who wished to participate, and more than fifty organizations participated in
its fifth session in 1987.39 ' The group has seen itself as the primary center
for the collection of information about the condition of indigenous people
around the world. They have documented numerous killings, arrests, tortures,
land deprivations, and desecration of religious sites.3" They have pointed to
the link between autonomy and self-determination on the one hand and peace
and development on the other.393 The group's primary effort since 1985,
however, has been the production of a draft declaration of the rights of
indigenous populations.
The Draft Declaration3" is now in its third revision. The Working Group
on Indigenous Populations completed its work in July and submitted the draft
to the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities. From the Subcommission the Declaration moves to the U.N.
Human Rights Commission in March of 1994, then to the Economic and
Social Council and finally, to the General Assembly. 9
In many ways the Declaration is a revolutionary document. One of its
primary objectives is the protection of the right of indigenous groups to exist
and to preserve their own culture. It calls for the right to "full and effective
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms," as well as the
390. ROBERT N. CLINTON Er AL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 1295 (1991).
391. Id. at 1296.
392. Id. at 1297.
393. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples, Report of the United Nations Technical
Conference on Practical Experience in the Realization of Sustainable and Environmentally Sound
Self-Development of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Human Rights, 44th Sess.,
Agenda Item 15, at 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/31 (prov. ed. 1992) [hereinafter Report].
394. Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations on its Tenth Session, United Nations Sub-Commission Draft Declaration
on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, U.N. ESCOR Comm. on Human Rights, 44th Sess., Agenda
Item 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993) [hereinafter Declaration].
395. INDIAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS (Indian Law Resource Center Memorandum, Helena,
Mont.), No. 4, Summer 1993, at 2.
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observance of the corresponding responsibilities, "which are recognized in the
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
international human rights law."3 It also emphasizes collective rights,3"
which the indigenous people overcome the limitations of individually-focused
rights norms. The Declaration also attempts to protect land holdings of
indigenous people from governmental confiscation."' Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the Declaration consistently refers to aboriginal populations as
"peoples," a deeply controversial title that troubles governmental representa-
tives because of its meaning within the U.N. Charter.
In the United Nations Charter, "peoples" are entitled to "equal rights and
self-determination." 3" Indigenous groups must attain the title "peoples"
because it identifies them as primarily a community, rather than an amalgam-
ation of individuals. The current draft of the Declaration states in part:
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination, in
accordance with international law by virtue of which they may
freely determine their political status and institutions and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. An
integral part of this is the right to autonomy and self-govern-
ment.'"
Identification as "distinct peoples" is existence in the international arena. As
international law now stands, peoples have enforceable rights under interna-
tional law, people are governed by national law. If the Declaration can state
that indigenous peoples are "peoples," then many of the international
protections which have previously been denied them would be secured.
The most direct statement on the rights of indigenous people can be found
in the 1989 International Labour Organization Convention of Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples. This convention revised a 1957 convention which represented
a mixture of assimilationist policies and protection for indigenous people. The
previous convention aimed to facilitate the progression of indigenous
populations into their national communities,4" but became inadequate as the
396. Declaration, supra note 394, at 46 (Annex I, pt. I, para. 2).
397. "Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as
distinct peoples and to full guarantees against genocide or any other act of violence, including
the removal of indigenous children from their families and communities under any pretext." Id.
at 46 (Annex I pt. II, para. 5).
398. Id. at 48-49 (Annex I, pt. IV, paras. 26, 27).
399. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, par. 2.
400. "Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and develop
their distinct ethnic and cultural characteristics and identities, including the right to self-
identification." Declaration, supra note 394, at 47 (Annex I, pt. II, par. 6).
401. ld. at 46 (Annex I, pt. I, para. 1).
402. International Labour Organization Convention (No. 107) Concerning the Protection and
Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries
pmbl., Jun,,- 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 (entered into force June 2, 1959).
374 [Vol. 18
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss2/2
"FREE" EXERCISE OF RELIGION
consensus of international opinion shifted toward helping indigenous
communities to maintain their unique cultural identities. Although internation-
al opinion on how to respond to indigenous peoples has changed since 1957,
the ILO deserves credit for adopting the first international legal instrument to
protect the rights of indigenous peoples.
The present ILO Convention speaks in terms of respecting "the special
importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of
their relationship with the lands or territories . . . which they occupy or
otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of that relationship."''
Clearly, the tenor of the 1989 Convention reflects developments in the
understanding of indigenous peoples. The 1989 Convention, unfortunately, has
not yet entered into force, and so carries no weight in international law at this
point. Despite its impotence, the ILO Convention is being considered in the
development of the Declaration of Indigenous Rights mentioned earlier.'
Other recent developments indicate that collective rights of ethnic
minorities, such as indigenous peoples, are beginning to get more respect. The
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de
Janiero during the summer of 1992 addressed many pressing indigenous and
environmental issues. Agenda 21 of the Conference Declaration states:
Indigenous peoples and their communities, and other local
communities, have a vital role in environmental management and
development because of their knowledge and traditional practices.
States should recognize and duly support their identity, culture
and interests and enable their effective participation in the
achievement of sustainable development.'5
Indigenous people are making their presence felt at international decision-
making forums and have even gained consultative status at a number of
United Nations bodies.'s In 1985, the General Assembly of the United
Nations established the Voluntary Fund for Indigenous Populations to provide
financial assistance to representatives of indigenous communities and
organizations attending Working Group sessions. In 1992, Rigoberta Menchu,
the first indigenous person ever to be recognized for her work defending the
human rights of indigenous peoples, won the Nobel Peace Prize. She has been
appointed the United Nations Ambassador at Large and as such convened the
first Summit of Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala in May of 1993. Each of
403. Id. at art. 13.
404. Trends, ILO Takes Up Indian Cause; Latin American Legislation "In the Vanguard,"
WR-93-22 LATIN AM. WKLY. REP. 258 (issue dated June 10, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File.
405. Report, supra note 393, at 5 (quoting principle 22 of United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio de Janeiro, Braz., 1992)).
406. United Nations Economic and Social Council and others.
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these steps are important in the long road to respect for the rights of
indigenous peoples, but even they are not sufficient.
The United Nations made a powerful statement on December 10, 1992,
when it declared 1993 to be the International Year for the World's Indigenous
People.4" In his statement on the opening celebration of the Year of
Indigenous Peoples, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, "Unity
through diversity is the only true and enduring diversity.""4 ' He also
acknowledged that there "could be no protection of human rights without
preserving cultural authenticity."'
The second World Conference on Human Rights, which opened in Vienna
on June 14, 1993, gave special attention to the rights of indigenous peoples
in its deliberations. The results were a mixture of successes and failures. The
indigenous delegates succeeded in securing a recommendation from the
conference that the General Assembly declare a Decade of Indigenous Peoples
beginning in 1994 to give special attention to the world's 300,000,000
indigenous people. The indigenous peoples in attendance at the conference
also sought to solidify their right to self-determination within the nation-state
system and renewed the argument over whether they should be known as
"peoples" or simply "people." On the latter score, nations again failed to
protect indigenous rights as the crucial "s" was deleted from every paragraph
referring to indigenous peoples in the concluding document by the Brazilian
president of the drafting committee, Gilberto Saboia, on June 20, 1993.41"
As a result, the Conference only recognized the variety of peoples represented
by 200 delegates from all over the globe as one people, despite differences in
culture, language, religions, and native lands.
While the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights was going
on, a Nongovernmental Organization-Forum was also held in Vienna. The
NGO-Forum was attended by 2000 people representing 1000 human rights
NGOs. The NGO-Forum provided an opportunity for human rights organiza-
tions to evaluate the performance of the United Nations in promoting human
rights. 'Te organizations present also made recommendations on how to
improve the United Nations' human rights programs. One working group
evaluated the state of indigenous peoples rights and made recommendations
for improvement. They contributed the following to the final statement of the
NGO-Forum:
407. G.A. Res. 45/164, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., 69th plen. mtg., at 277-78, U.N. Doc. No.
E/CN.4/1992/2 (1990).
408. United Nations: Indigenous Year Gets Off to a Bumpy Start, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Dec. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Onni File.
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The members of the working group B stress the distinct
characteristics of indigenous peoples which distinguish them from
minorities. They urge that indigenous peoples be recognized as
nations with inherent collective rights of self-determination,
development, self-government and autonomy.
Recommendations include the proclamation of the International
Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples, the establishment of
a High Commissioner, a Special Rapporteur or another permanent
UN body with adequate resources for the protection of the rights
of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, they urge the UN to adopt,
without further delay, the strongest possible draft of the Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and to ensure full
participation of representatives of indigenous peoples in the
drafting process and related activities.411
These recommendations, if adopted by the United Nations, would be a good
start toward the protection of the rights of indigenous peoples.41
The International Year of Indigenous People is only a start. Even a Decade
of Indigenous People and a Declaration of Indigenous Rights are but a
beginning. The road to a more just future will be secured only when the
international community both acknowledges the terrible history of oppression
that is the story of the relationship between indigenous peoples and the
dominant societies, and affirms the inherent right of all indigenous pt~oples to
the protection of their culture, land, religion, and ethnicity. Today's efforts are
essential, but much remains to be done. They are, however, cause for hope.
Though indigenous people lack substantive guarantees of their rights even
today, the rosy fingers of a new dawn are visible on the horizon.
411. Final Statement at the World Conference on Human Rights, NGO-Forum (All Human
Rights for All), Vienna, Aus. (June 12, 1993) (on file with author).
412. These references are current as of July 1, 1993. The Drafting Committee for the
Universal Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was scheduled to meet in mid-July
1993. A third draft of the Universal Declaration was expected in the fall of 1993.
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